Source fetched 2026-09-26T00:55:53Z

NVDA × Meteora

Exact-token support is source-listed Evidence for this stage was checked 2026-09-26T00:55:53Z. The protocol or product source names this exact token. No configuration decoding or read-only execution simulation was performed.

Source-described use: Swap the token or provide liquidity in 1 observed Meteora pool.

Open NVDA token report · Open backpack-securities issuer dossier

Exact token and source-described action

Solana token address: NVDAVuiB7hwd3m5Wa1JuHNovPaPG6BH1QNztbKFxNjv
Actions described by source: swap, provide-liquidity
Source-reported integration status: live
Access limits: No access condition was recorded.
Direct links: Open market / product ↗

Proof status: a source listing does not prove execution

Achieved proof stage: source-listed
Source proof status: exact-token-registry
Source fetched: 2026-09-26T00:55:53Z
Activity observed: An activity indicator was observed; its stated basis is volume24Usd, txns24. Reported metrics are not independently executed trades.
Account existence: checked (1/1 referenced accounts)
Configuration decoded: Not performed
Read-only execution simulation: Not performed

Source evidence

protocol-api: 1 pool also resolved in Meteora’s own per-pool API. Open source ↗

Referenced accounts and owners

Role	Address	Existence check	Expected owner	Observed program owner
liquidity-pool	`228hJRowEqgwZQxC9hV72EPa1VKfVUtsXhHY1ubfSwKg`	exists	`Not established`	`LBUZKhRxPF3XUpBCjp4YzTKgLccjZhTSDM9YuVaPwxo`

The source data records observed owners. Where the source publishes no expected owner, the expected owner is not established. Account existence and owner confirm the published reference; they do not decode configuration or prove that a user action can succeed.

Recorded parameters

Maximum LTV: Not reported
Liquidation LTV: Not reported
Liquidation penalty: Not reported
Configured / observed size: $217,123.85
24 h volume: $6,346.75
24 h transactions: 8
Oracle: Not reported

Markets and configured addresses

Market / pool
228hJRowEqgwZQxC9hV72EPa1VKfVUtsXhHY1ubfSwKg
Watch this exact market →

Custody and default outcomes

Borrower default / seizure

The lender can seize the token, not the trust claim

The lending contract can transfer or sell the on-chain balance if transfers are open. The trustee recognises Trek Forge, not the wallet holder, so the lender obtains no direct redemption, distribution or enforcement right merely by taking the token; ordinary exit requires a market buyer or a KYC-eligible Backpack account.

Protocol hack custody

Issuer intervention is technically possible

The permanent delegate can remove or burn tokens from any token account and the mint can be paused. That may permit recovery after a hack, but no reviewed term obliges the issuer to act for the protocol, and the same power means protocol custody is not final.

Access or key loss

Recovery depends on the issuer

A permanent delegate can technically extract or burn a balance stranded in an inaccessible program account. Whether Backpack would recognise the claimant and reissue or credit the position is discretionary and not a protocol-enforceable remedy.

These conclusions come from the issuer and control recipe from the matched legal template. They are not protocol simulation results.

Lender exit after receiving the token

No source-listed collateral route — No checked protocol source currently lists this exact token as programmatic collateral.

Observed DEX liquidity: $217,123.85
Issuer redemption established: yes
Key limit: Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.