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Source fetched 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z

MSTR × Nest

Exact-token support is source-listed The protocol or product source names this exact token. No configuration decoding or read-only execution simulation was performed.

Source-described use: Deposit this exact mint into its configured Nest collateral market and mint the nUSD stablecoin against it.

Open MSTR token report · Open backpack-securities issuer dossier

Exact token and source-described action

Solana token address
MSTRdWXMeZxdE8osAQy3fA4rvTY5rgummDSMEx6U7Nz
Actions described by source
collateral, borrow
Source-reported integration status
available
Access limits
Nest eligibility and geographic restrictions apply.
Direct links
Open market / product ↗ · Protocol documentation ↗

Proof status — do not read a source listing as execution proof

Achieved proof stage
source-listed
Source proof status
exact-token-registry
Source fetched
2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
Activity observed
Reported market metrics, if shown, are source-reported parameters or activity indicators, not independently executed trades.
Account existence
checked (2/2 referenced accounts)
Configuration decoded
Not performed
Read-only execution simulation
Not performed

Source evidence

Referenced accounts and owners

RoleAddressExistence checkExpected ownerObserved program owner
collateral-configJADC7gsPvF62QaHBtLuMadDcVXXtvVjeeuHhsyM6fJdZexistsNot establishedHxbLPNuQD7KKDVQoSQgY1cLMLrsaoseT65Xoczh7zHQW
collateral-vault7wWtZmPpwQuvSuEF8mKuaKubACLcxFY5G5uYRSpZSP9YexistsNot establishedTokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb

The current source data records observed owners, not a separately published expected-owner assertion; where no such assertion exists, it remains not established. Account existence and owner corroborate the published reference but do not independently decode configuration or prove a user action can succeed.

Recorded parameters

Maximum LTV
40%
Liquidation LTV
50%
Liquidation penalty
Not reported
Configured / observed size
Not reported
24 h volume
Not reported
24 h transactions
Not reported
Oracle
jupiter-signed

Markets and configured addresses

Custody and default outcomes

Borrower default / seizure

The lender can seize the token, not the trust claim

The lending contract can transfer or sell the on-chain balance if transfers are open. The trustee recognises Trek Forge, not the wallet holder, so the lender obtains no direct redemption, distribution or enforcement right merely by taking the token; ordinary exit requires a market buyer or a KYC-eligible Backpack account.

Protocol hack custody

Issuer intervention is technically possible

The permanent delegate can remove or burn tokens from any token account and the mint can be paused. That may permit recovery after a hack, but no reviewed term obliges the issuer to act for the protocol, and the same power means protocol custody is not final.

Access or key loss

Recovery depends on the issuer

A permanent delegate can technically extract or burn a balance stranded in an inaccessible program account. Whether Backpack would recognise the claimant and reissue or credit the position is discretionary and not a protocol-enforceable remedy.

These are issuer-plus-control-recipe conclusions from the matched legal template — not protocol simulation results.

Lender exit after receiving the token

Conditional market exit — The lender can use a checked on-chain sale route, but issuer controls, transfer conditions, or thin liquidity may prevent full realisation.

Observed DEX liquidity
$308,429.86
Issuer redemption established
yes
Key limit
Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.