Source fetched 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z

LLY × Raydium

An exact-token market was observed Market-data collection observed this exact-token market. No configuration decoding or read-only execution simulation was performed.

Source-described use: Swap the token or provide liquidity in 1 observed Raydium pool.

Open LLY token report · Open backpack-securities issuer dossier

Exact token and source-described action

Solana token address: LLYuwZ33keFihgwoxXsBawy31AiRFLFSva32TYq5TvD
Actions described by source: swap, provide-liquidity
Source-reported integration status: live
Access limits: No access condition was recorded.
Direct links: Open market / product ↗

Proof status — do not read a source listing as execution proof

Achieved proof stage: observed-market
Source proof status: observed-market
Source fetched: 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
Activity observed: An activity indicator was observed; its stated basis is volume24Usd, txns24. Reported metrics are not independently executed trades.
Account existence: checked (1/1 referenced accounts)
Configuration decoded: Not performed
Read-only execution simulation: Not performed

Source evidence

market-data-aggregator: The exact pool address and current pool metrics were observed in the Solana DexScreener feed. Open source ↗

Referenced accounts and owners

Role	Address	Existence check	Expected owner	Observed program owner
liquidity-pool	`2rvGfFMWVVyp2doAHFvHzpU6riZqEUtAcEktKBw8XVNq`	exists	`Not established`	`CAMMCzo5YL8w4VFF8KVHrK22GGUsp5VTaW7grrKgrWqK`

The current source data records observed owners, not a separately published expected-owner assertion; where no such assertion exists, it remains not established. Account existence and owner corroborate the published reference but do not independently decode configuration or prove a user action can succeed.

Recorded parameters

Maximum LTV: Not reported
Liquidation LTV: Not reported
Liquidation penalty: Not reported
Configured / observed size: $6,117.1
24 h volume: $15,948.72
24 h transactions: 304
Oracle: Not reported

Markets and configured addresses

Market / pool
2rvGfFMWVVyp2doAHFvHzpU6riZqEUtAcEktKBw8XVNq

Custody and default outcomes

Borrower default / seizure

The lender can seize the token, not the trust claim

The lending contract can transfer or sell the on-chain balance if transfers are open. The trustee recognises Trek Forge, not the wallet holder, so the lender obtains no direct redemption, distribution or enforcement right merely by taking the token; ordinary exit requires a market buyer or a KYC-eligible Backpack account.

Protocol hack custody

Issuer intervention is technically possible

The permanent delegate can remove or burn tokens from any token account and the mint can be paused. That may permit recovery after a hack, but no reviewed term obliges the issuer to act for the protocol, and the same power means protocol custody is not final.

Access or key loss

Recovery depends on the issuer

A permanent delegate can technically extract or burn a balance stranded in an inaccessible program account. Whether Backpack would recognise the claimant and reissue or credit the position is discretionary and not a protocol-enforceable remedy.

These are issuer-plus-control-recipe conclusions from the matched legal template — not protocol simulation results.

Lender exit after receiving the token

No confirmed collateral route — No checked protocol currently accepts this exact token as programmatic collateral.

Observed DEX liquidity: $6,117.1
Issuer redemption established: yes
Key limit: Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.