← All protocol dossiersSource fetched 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
HOOD × Nest
The protocol’s own list names this exact token Evidence for this stage was checked 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z. The protocol’s registry or product page names this exact token. We have not read its settings or simulated a transaction.
Source-described use: Deposit this exact mint into its configured Nest collateral market and mint the nUSD stablecoin against it.
Open HOOD token report · Open backpack-securities issuer dossier
Exact token and source-described action
- Solana token address
HooDYv5RewLRiMLnEVq3VJqdqxhuE6c5eYvqejMC3e9A- Actions described by source
- collateral, borrow
- Source-reported integration status
- available
- Access limits
- Nest eligibility and geographic restrictions apply.
- Direct links
- Open market / product ↗ · Protocol documentation ↗
Proof status: a source listing does not prove execution
- Achieved proof stage
- source-listed
- Source proof status
- exact-token-registry
- Source fetched
- 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
- Activity observed
- Any figures shown are what the protocol reports, not trades we made or checked.
- Account existence
- checked (2/2 referenced accounts)
- Configuration decoded
- Not performed
- Read-only execution simulation
- Not performed
Source evidence
- deployment-manifest: Nest's nest-public-deployment-v1 manifest contains a configured market for this exact collateral mint. Open source ↗
Referenced accounts and owners
The source data records observed owners. Where the source publishes no expected owner, the expected owner is not established. Account existence and owner confirm the published reference; they do not decode configuration or prove that a user action can succeed.
Recorded parameters
- Maximum LTV
- 40%
- Liquidation LTV
- 50%
- Liquidation penalty
- Not reported
- Configured / observed size
- Not reported
- 24 h volume
- Not reported
- 24 h transactions
- Not reported
- Oracle
- jupiter-signed
Markets and configured addresses
Custody and default outcomes
Borrower default / seizure
The lender can seize the token, not the trust claim
The lending contract can transfer or sell the on-chain balance if transfers are open. The trustee recognises Trek Forge, not the wallet holder, so the lender obtains no direct redemption, distribution or enforcement right merely by taking the token; ordinary exit requires a market buyer or a KYC-eligible Backpack account.
Protocol hack custody
Issuer intervention is technically possible
The permanent delegate can remove or burn tokens from any token account and the mint can be paused. That may permit recovery after a hack, but no reviewed term obliges the issuer to act for the protocol, and the same power means protocol custody is not final.
Access or key loss
Recovery depends on the issuer
A permanent delegate can technically extract or burn a balance stranded in an inaccessible program account. Whether Backpack would recognise the claimant and reissue or credit the position is discretionary and not a protocol-enforceable remedy.
These conclusions come from the issuer and control recipe from the matched legal template. They are not protocol simulation results.
Lender exit after receiving the token
Conditional market exit — A lending protocol that lists it as collateral and a live on-chain pool indicate a possible route, but execution was not independently tested and issuer controls, transfer conditions, or thin liquidity may prevent full realisation.
- Observed DEX liquidity
- $272,172.94
- Issuer redemption established
- yes
- Key limit
- Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.