← All protocol dossiersSource fetched 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
BOT × Raydium
An exact-token market was observed Market-data collection observed this exact-token market. No configuration decoding or read-only execution simulation was performed.
Source-described use: Swap the token or provide liquidity in 1 observed Raydium pool.
Open BOT token report · Open backpack-securities issuer dossier
Exact token and source-described action
- Solana token address
BoTx8y9ynfdxf5ZjWtCoBVkff52qKA82ysaLU8ZM6d8T- Actions described by source
- swap, provide-liquidity
- Source-reported integration status
- live
- Access limits
- No access condition was recorded.
- Direct links
- Open market / product ↗
Proof status — do not read a source listing as execution proof
- Achieved proof stage
- observed-market
- Source proof status
- observed-market
- Source fetched
- 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
- Activity observed
- An activity indicator was observed; its stated basis is volume24Usd, txns24. Reported metrics are not independently executed trades.
- Account existence
- checked (1/1 referenced accounts)
- Configuration decoded
- Not performed
- Read-only execution simulation
- Not performed
Source evidence
- market-data-aggregator: The exact pool address and current pool metrics were observed in the Solana DexScreener feed. Open source ↗
Referenced accounts and owners
The current source data records observed owners, not a separately published expected-owner assertion; where no such assertion exists, it remains not established. Account existence and owner corroborate the published reference but do not independently decode configuration or prove a user action can succeed.
Recorded parameters
- Maximum LTV
- Not reported
- Liquidation LTV
- Not reported
- Liquidation penalty
- Not reported
- Configured / observed size
- $76,145.19
- 24 h volume
- $801,813.54
- 24 h transactions
- 5630
- Oracle
- Not reported
Markets and configured addresses
- Market / pool
cPK91ascbHz3pXHVqLbhBbbQs3ztMvu1681w5EfoGyP
Custody and default outcomes
Borrower default / seizure
The lender can seize the token, not the trust claim
The lending contract can transfer or sell the on-chain balance if transfers are open. The trustee recognises Trek Forge, not the wallet holder, so the lender obtains no direct redemption, distribution or enforcement right merely by taking the token; ordinary exit requires a market buyer or a KYC-eligible Backpack account.
Protocol hack custody
Issuer intervention is technically possible
The permanent delegate can remove or burn tokens from any token account and the mint can be paused. That may permit recovery after a hack, but no reviewed term obliges the issuer to act for the protocol, and the same power means protocol custody is not final.
Access or key loss
Recovery depends on the issuer
A permanent delegate can technically extract or burn a balance stranded in an inaccessible program account. Whether Backpack would recognise the claimant and reissue or credit the position is discretionary and not a protocol-enforceable remedy.
These are issuer-plus-control-recipe conclusions from the matched legal template — not protocol simulation results.
Lender exit after receiving the token
Conditional market exit — The lender can use a checked on-chain sale route, but issuer controls, transfer conditions, or thin liquidity may prevent full realisation.
- Observed DEX liquidity
- $76,145.19
- Issuer redemption established
- yes
- Key limit
- Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.