← All protocol dossiersSource fetched 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
TTWO × Nest
Exact-token support is source-listed The protocol or product source names this exact token. No configuration decoding or read-only execution simulation was performed.
Source-described use: Deposit this exact mint into its configured Nest collateral market and mint the nUSD stablecoin against it.
Open TTWO token report · Open backpack-securities issuer dossier
Exact token and source-described action
- Solana token address
TTWofwAge91oFhZs7kpQdyrVRkmevgM88xijGvQFbKo- Actions described by source
- collateral, borrow
- Source-reported integration status
- available
- Access limits
- Nest eligibility and geographic restrictions apply.
- Direct links
- Open market / product ↗ · Protocol documentation ↗
Proof status — do not read a source listing as execution proof
- Achieved proof stage
- source-listed
- Source proof status
- exact-token-registry
- Source fetched
- 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
- Activity observed
- Reported market metrics, if shown, are source-reported parameters or activity indicators, not independently executed trades.
- Account existence
- checked (2/2 referenced accounts)
- Configuration decoded
- Not performed
- Read-only execution simulation
- Not performed
Source evidence
- deployment-manifest: Nest's nest-public-deployment-v1 manifest contains a configured market for this exact collateral mint. Open source ↗
Referenced accounts and owners
The current source data records observed owners, not a separately published expected-owner assertion; where no such assertion exists, it remains not established. Account existence and owner corroborate the published reference but do not independently decode configuration or prove a user action can succeed.
Recorded parameters
- Maximum LTV
- 40%
- Liquidation LTV
- 50%
- Liquidation penalty
- Not reported
- Configured / observed size
- Not reported
- 24 h volume
- Not reported
- 24 h transactions
- Not reported
- Oracle
- jupiter-signed
Markets and configured addresses
- TTWO / nUSD
FfXxzKaYm4tMPV5tV8d4rWqjNj57j3yPRZS9rs8kEeCC
Custody and default outcomes
Borrower default / seizure
The lender can seize the token, not the trust claim
The lending contract can transfer or sell the on-chain balance if transfers are open. The trustee recognises Trek Forge, not the wallet holder, so the lender obtains no direct redemption, distribution or enforcement right merely by taking the token; ordinary exit requires a market buyer or a KYC-eligible Backpack account.
Protocol hack custody
Issuer intervention is technically possible
The permanent delegate can remove or burn tokens from any token account and the mint can be paused. That may permit recovery after a hack, but no reviewed term obliges the issuer to act for the protocol, and the same power means protocol custody is not final.
Access or key loss
Recovery depends on the issuer
A permanent delegate can technically extract or burn a balance stranded in an inaccessible program account. Whether Backpack would recognise the claimant and reissue or credit the position is discretionary and not a protocol-enforceable remedy.
These are issuer-plus-control-recipe conclusions from the matched legal template — not protocol simulation results.
Lender exit after receiving the token
Conditional market exit — The lender can use a checked on-chain sale route, but issuer controls, transfer conditions, or thin liquidity may prevent full realisation.
- Observed DEX liquidity
- $6.6
- Issuer redemption established
- yes
- Key limit
- Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.