← All protocol dossiersSource fetched 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
QQQon × Nest
The protocol’s own list names this exact token Evidence for this stage was checked 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z. The protocol’s registry or product page names this exact token. We have not read its settings or simulated a transaction.
Source-described use: Deposit this exact mint into its configured Nest collateral market and mint the nUSD stablecoin against it.
Open QQQon token report · Open ondo-global-markets issuer dossier
Exact token and source-described action
- Solana token address
HrYNm6jTQ71LoFphjVKBTdAE4uja7WsmLG8VxB8ondo- Actions described by source
- collateral, borrow
- Source-reported integration status
- available
- Access limits
- Nest eligibility and geographic restrictions apply.
- Direct links
- Open market / product ↗ · Protocol documentation ↗
Proof status: a source listing does not prove execution
- Achieved proof stage
- source-listed
- Source proof status
- exact-token-registry
- Source fetched
- 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
- Activity observed
- Any figures shown are what the protocol reports, not trades we made or checked.
- Account existence
- checked (2/2 referenced accounts)
- Configuration decoded
- Not performed
- Read-only execution simulation
- Not performed
Source evidence
- deployment-manifest: Nest's nest-public-deployment-v1 manifest contains a configured market for this exact collateral mint. Open source ↗
Referenced accounts and owners
The source data records observed owners. Where the source publishes no expected owner, the expected owner is not established. Account existence and owner confirm the published reference; they do not decode configuration or prove that a user action can succeed.
Recorded parameters
- Maximum LTV
- 60%
- Liquidation LTV
- 70%
- Liquidation penalty
- Not reported
- Configured / observed size
- Not reported
- 24 h volume
- Not reported
- 24 h transactions
- Not reported
- Oracle
- jupiter-signed
Markets and configured addresses
Custody and default outcomes
Borrower default / seizure
On-chain seizure works; redemption is gated
The protocol can transfer or sell the balance after default while transfers are open. A lender seeking cash redemption must satisfy the issuer's KYC/AML process, so autonomous liquidation depends on secondary-market depth rather than an unconditional redemption rail.
Protocol hack custody
The issuer can stop, but not directly reverse
The pause and freeze authorities can immobilise affected accounts and halt transfers. No permanent delegate is present, so the observed mint controls do not themselves let the issuer extract a stolen balance; cancellation or reissue would require a separate legal and operational process.
Access or key loss
Freezing does not unlock a stranded account
The issuer can freeze the inaccessible account but cannot transfer from it with the observed extensions. Recovery would require an evidenced cancellation/reissue process outside the escrow contract, and none is treated here as automatic.
These conclusions come from the issuer and control recipe from the matched legal template. They are not protocol simulation results.
Lender exit after receiving the token
Issuer-dependent exit — The remaining cash route is issuer redemption, which requires an eligible KYC/AML-approved holder.
- Observed DEX liquidity
- Not reported
- Issuer redemption established
- yes
- Key limit
- Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.