Source fetched 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z

USOon × Orca

An exact-token market was observed Market-data collection observed this exact-token market. No configuration decoding or read-only execution simulation was performed.

Source-described use: Swap the token or provide liquidity in 1 observed Orca pool.

Open USOon token report · Open ondo-global-markets issuer dossier

Exact token and source-described action

Solana token address: rpydAzWdCy85HEmoQkH5PVxYtDYQWjmLxgHHadxondo
Actions described by source: swap, provide-liquidity
Source-reported integration status: available
Access limits: No access condition was recorded.
Direct links: Open market / product ↗

Proof status — do not read a source listing as execution proof

Achieved proof stage: observed-market
Source proof status: observed-market
Source fetched: 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
Activity observed: An activity indicator was observed; its stated basis is txns24. Reported metrics are not independently executed trades.
Account existence: checked (1/1 referenced accounts)
Configuration decoded: Not performed
Read-only execution simulation: Not performed

Source evidence

market-data-aggregator: The exact pool address and current pool metrics were observed in the Solana DexScreener feed. Open source ↗

Referenced accounts and owners

Role	Address	Existence check	Expected owner	Observed program owner
liquidity-pool	`3m3wEpAGxgRbgDck4MY7tMzBVC1KYUByC74wvidRcXoG`	exists	`Not established`	`whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc`

The current source data records observed owners, not a separately published expected-owner assertion; where no such assertion exists, it remains not established. Account existence and owner corroborate the published reference but do not independently decode configuration or prove a user action can succeed.

Recorded parameters

Maximum LTV: Not reported
Liquidation LTV: Not reported
Liquidation penalty: Not reported
Configured / observed size: $0
24 h volume: $0
24 h transactions: 9
Oracle: Not reported

Markets and configured addresses

Market / pool
3m3wEpAGxgRbgDck4MY7tMzBVC1KYUByC74wvidRcXoG

Custody and default outcomes

Borrower default / seizure

On-chain seizure works; redemption is gated

The protocol can transfer or sell the balance after default while transfers are open. A lender seeking cash redemption must satisfy the issuer's KYC/AML process, so autonomous liquidation depends on secondary-market depth rather than an unconditional redemption rail.

Protocol hack custody

The issuer can stop, but not directly reverse

The pause and freeze authorities can immobilise affected accounts and halt transfers. No permanent delegate is present, so the observed mint controls do not themselves let the issuer extract a stolen balance; cancellation or reissue would require a separate legal and operational process.

Access or key loss

Freezing does not unlock a stranded account

The issuer can freeze the inaccessible account but cannot transfer from it with the observed extensions. Recovery would require an evidenced cancellation/reissue process outside the escrow contract, and none is treated here as automatic.

These are issuer-plus-control-recipe conclusions from the matched legal template — not protocol simulation results.

Lender exit after receiving the token

No confirmed collateral route — No checked protocol currently accepts this exact token as programmatic collateral.

Observed DEX liquidity: Not reported
Issuer redemption established: yes
Key limit: Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.