← All protocol dossiersSource fetched 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
TSLAx × Jupiter Lend
The protocol’s own list names this exact token Evidence for this stage was checked 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z. The protocol’s registry or product page names this exact token. We have not read its settings or simulated a transaction.
Source-described use: Post this exact mint as collateral in a Jupiter Lend vault and borrow an enabled debt token against it.
Open TSLAx token report · Open xstocks-backed issuer dossier
Exact token and source-described action
- Solana token address
XsDoVfqeBukxuZHWhdvWHBhgEHjGNst4MLodqsJHzoB- Actions described by source
- collateral, borrow
- Source-reported integration status
- live
- Access limits
- Issuer eligibility and the protocol’s geographic restrictions apply; direct issuer redemption remains KYC-gated.
- Direct links
- Open market / product ↗ · Protocol documentation ↗
Proof status: a source listing does not prove execution
- Achieved proof stage
- source-listed
- Source proof status
- exact-token-registry
- Source fetched
- 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
- Activity observed
- We saw activity, based on positions. Reported figures are not trades we made or checked.
- Account existence
- checked (3/3 referenced accounts)
- Configuration decoded
- Not performed
- Read-only execution simulation
- Not performed
Source evidence
- protocol-api: 2 current vault rows match this exact collateral mint. Open source ↗
Referenced accounts and owners
The source data records observed owners. Where the source publishes no expected owner, the expected owner is not established. Account existence and owner confirm the published reference; they do not decode configuration or prove that a user action can succeed.
Recorded parameters
- Maximum LTV
- 65%
- Liquidation LTV
- 75%
- Liquidation penalty
- 3%
- Configured / observed size
- $1,567,552.74
- 24 h volume
- Not reported
- 24 h transactions
- Not reported
- Oracle
- chainlinkDataStreams
Markets and configured addresses
- Borrow USDC
5f561RUPHDqRh98W62FdaYjHCqEvwzV7ePHXszdfQC5Z
Debt mint: EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v (USDC)
Watch this exact market → - Borrow JupUSD
3zvPLKm39qtTzqRg3i5N1cLKEvW7eqq7Pojzvkn4VreQ
Debt mint: JuprjznTrTSp2UFa3ZBUFgwdAmtZCq4MQCwysN55USD (JupUSD)
Watch this exact market →
Custody and default outcomes
Borrower default / seizure
The lender can seize and sell; redemption is gated
The token is a transferable bearer ledger-based security, so the contract can transfer or sell it after default while the mint is open. Direct redemption for cash is not autonomous: the lender must pass KYC/AML and the issuer may reject a request on negative findings.
Protocol hack custody
Clawback may reverse a theft
The permanent delegate and pause authority can technically contain or reverse a hacked transfer. Assistance is discretionary rather than a protocol right, and the same powers can reverse the protocol's own custody or liquidation outcome.
Access or key loss
Issuer action can rescue a stranded token
The permanent delegate can technically move or burn a balance in an inaccessible account. A replacement or redemption still depends on the issuer accepting the claimant, completing compliance checks and exercising that power.
These conclusions come from the issuer and control recipe from the matched legal template. They are not protocol simulation results.
Lender exit after receiving the token
Conditional market exit — A lending protocol that lists it as collateral and a live on-chain pool indicate a possible route, but execution was not independently tested and issuer controls, transfer conditions, or thin liquidity may prevent full realisation.
- Observed DEX liquidity
- $94,102.61
- Issuer redemption established
- yes
- Key limit
- Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.