Source fetched 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z

tKalshi × Meteora

Exact-token support is source-listed The protocol or product source names this exact token. No configuration decoding or read-only execution simulation was performed.

Source-described use: Swap the token or provide liquidity in 1 observed Meteora pool.

Open tKalshi token report · Open tessera issuer dossier

Exact token and source-described action

Solana token address: TKLSidmLVt3cqGaaodG8tyRzoANfQwoh67AccjmubeZ
Actions described by source: swap, provide-liquidity
Source-reported integration status: live
Access limits: No access condition was recorded.
Direct links: Open market / product ↗

Proof status — do not read a source listing as execution proof

Achieved proof stage: source-listed
Source proof status: exact-token-registry
Source fetched: 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
Activity observed: An activity indicator was observed; its stated basis is volume24Usd, txns24. Reported metrics are not independently executed trades.
Account existence: checked (1/1 referenced accounts)
Configuration decoded: Not performed
Read-only execution simulation: Not performed

Source evidence

protocol-api: 1 pool also resolved in Meteora’s own per-pool API. Open source ↗

Referenced accounts and owners

Role	Address	Existence check	Expected owner	Observed program owner
liquidity-pool	`CGYxcqLiJEoYapZrU7uVGBGfEE15pXDV4mB9AQ8Fsuff`	exists	`Not established`	`LBUZKhRxPF3XUpBCjp4YzTKgLccjZhTSDM9YuVaPwxo`

The current source data records observed owners, not a separately published expected-owner assertion; where no such assertion exists, it remains not established. Account existence and owner corroborate the published reference but do not independently decode configuration or prove a user action can succeed.

Recorded parameters

Maximum LTV: Not reported
Liquidation LTV: Not reported
Liquidation penalty: Not reported
Configured / observed size: $655,683.6
24 h volume: $360,813.98
24 h transactions: 8578
Oracle: Not reported

Markets and configured addresses

Market / pool
CGYxcqLiJEoYapZrU7uVGBGfEE15pXDV4mB9AQ8Fsuff

Custody and default outcomes

Borrower default / seizure

The lender can seize the transferable claim

The protocol can transfer or sell the token after default, net of the transfer fee. The terms extend the contingent redemption right to a subsequent acquirer and exercise occurs by burning the token during the redemption window, so the legal claim broadly travels with possession.

Protocol hack custody

A theft can be frozen, not clawed back

The issuer's observed freeze authority can immobilise a hacked account, but no permanent delegate is present to extract the token. Recovery would require a separate cancellation or reissue decision; until then the frozen balance is unusable.

Access or key loss

Key loss can strand the claim

The observed mint controls cannot transfer a balance out of an inaccessible program account. Freezing prevents movement but does not restore access, and the terms do not make cancellation and reissue an automatic holder remedy.

These are issuer-plus-control-recipe conclusions from the matched legal template — not protocol simulation results.

Lender exit after receiving the token

No confirmed collateral route — No checked protocol currently accepts this exact token as programmatic collateral.

Observed DEX liquidity: $655,683.6
Issuer redemption established: yes
Key limit: Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.