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Source fetched 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z

tKalshi × Meteora

The protocol’s own list names this exact token Evidence for this stage was checked 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z. The protocol’s registry or product page names this exact token. We have not read its settings or simulated a transaction.

Source-described use: Swap the token or provide liquidity in 1 observed Meteora pool.

Open tKalshi token report · Open tessera issuer dossier

Exact token and source-described action

Solana token address
TKLSidmLVt3cqGaaodG8tyRzoANfQwoh67AccjmubeZ
Actions described by source
swap, provide-liquidity
Source-reported integration status
live
Access limits
No access condition was recorded.
Direct links
Open market / product ↗

Proof status: a source listing does not prove execution

Achieved proof stage
source-listed
Source proof status
exact-token-registry
Source fetched
2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
Activity observed
We saw activity, based on volume24Usd, txns24. Reported figures are not trades we made or checked.
Account existence
checked (1/1 referenced accounts)
Configuration decoded
Not performed
Read-only execution simulation
Not performed

Source evidence

Referenced accounts and owners

RoleAddressExistence checkExpected ownerObserved program owner
liquidity-poolCGYxcqLiJEoYapZrU7uVGBGfEE15pXDV4mB9AQ8FsuffexistsNot establishedLBUZKhRxPF3XUpBCjp4YzTKgLccjZhTSDM9YuVaPwxo

The source data records observed owners. Where the source publishes no expected owner, the expected owner is not established. Account existence and owner confirm the published reference; they do not decode configuration or prove that a user action can succeed.

Recorded parameters

Maximum LTV
Not reported
Liquidation LTV
Not reported
Liquidation penalty
Not reported
Configured / observed size
$705,868.7
24 h volume
$131,805.58
24 h transactions
5142
Oracle
Not reported

Markets and configured addresses

Custody and default outcomes

Borrower default / seizure

The lender can seize the transferable claim

The protocol can transfer or sell the token after default, net of the transfer fee. The terms extend the contingent redemption right to a subsequent acquirer and exercise occurs by burning the token during the redemption window, so the legal claim broadly travels with possession.

Protocol hack custody

A theft can be frozen, not clawed back

The issuer's observed freeze authority can immobilise a hacked account, but no permanent delegate is present to extract the token. Recovery would require a separate cancellation or reissue decision; until then the frozen balance is unusable.

Access or key loss

Key loss can strand the claim

The observed mint controls cannot transfer a balance out of an inaccessible program account. Freezing prevents movement but does not restore access, and the terms do not make cancellation and reissue an automatic holder remedy.

These conclusions come from the issuer and control recipe from the matched legal template. They are not protocol simulation results.

Lender exit after receiving the token

No protocol lists it as collateral — No protocol we checked lists this exact token as collateral.

Observed DEX liquidity
$705,868.7
Issuer redemption established
yes
Key limit
Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.