Source fetched 2026-09-26T00:55:53Z

SPYx × Loopscale

Configuration was decoded for this exact token Evidence for this stage was checked 2026-09-26T00:55:53Z. The protocol or product source names this exact token. Configuration decoding is not execution proof.

Source-described use: Posted as collateral in 2 Loopscale loans, read on-chain; open principal against it: $826 in stablecoins; 2 of the loans are past their end date and still open. 2 lending vaults list it as collateral.

Open SPYx token report · Open xstocks-backed issuer dossier

Exact token and source-described action

Solana token address: XsoCS1TfEyfFhfvj8EtZ528L3CaKBDBRqRapnBbDF2W
Actions described by source: collateral, borrow
Source-reported integration status: live
Access limits: Observed loans, not a published collateral listing. Loopscale and issuer eligibility, allowlisting and transfer restrictions apply to any new loan or liquidation transfer.
Direct links: Open market / product ↗ · Protocol documentation ↗

Proof status: a source listing does not prove execution

Achieved proof stage: decoded
Source proof status: exact-token-registry
Source fetched: 2026-09-26T00:55:53Z
Activity observed: An activity indicator was observed at 2026-09-26T00:55:53Z; its stated basis is positions, debtAgainstCollateralUsd. Reported metrics are not independently executed trades.
Account existence: checked (4/4 referenced accounts)
Configuration decoded: Performed — Loan account collateral and ledger records, plus the MarketInformation asset entry (oracle, maximum price age, LTV, liquidation threshold, allocation cap) and the lender strategy terms each loan is checked against. Decoded at slot 450520007 with the published IDL ↗.
Read-only execution simulation: Not performed

Source evidence

onchain-account: 2 Loan accounts of program 1oopBoJG58DgkUVKkEzKgyG9dvRmpgeEm1AVjoHkF78 name this mint in their own collateral record, with the amount posted and the principal due and repaid on each ledger. Open source ↗
program-attribution: The program id is named as Loopscale’s core program by Loopscale’s docs, the IDL in its GitHub organisation, and the program’s on-chain security.txt. Open source ↗
program-upgrade-authority: Upgrade authority (observed 2026-09-23): The ProgramData account 8KbXd8ATqDQQTozYv2TsCzHUDoiRyWe4DmzHdmJLgdNj names DwBXwJDZ4Av4miT62sEssWJUinkzwkmPPB4Fg3fKEfft as upgrade authority. That address is a system-owned account with no data, and it is vault index 0 of Squads v4 multisig C4awuufiuL8DNT5wMDP27HneKKqbgynrsbCa4XYGSuPk: SHA-256 of the seeds ["multisig", C4aw…, "vault", 0] with bump 255 reproduces DwBXwJ… byte for byte. The address is off the ed25519 curve, so no private key exists for it and only the Squads program can sign for it. In none of the 209 transactions examined does it appear as a transaction signer (every transaction that ever wrote the ProgramData, plus 40 spread across its 1,613-signature history). Every one of the 135 program upgrades (133 succeeded, 2 failed) ran as an inner BPF Upgradeable Loader Upgrade under a Squads VaultTransactionExecute, executed by four different members. The multisig account (finalized slot 449684389) decodes to threshold 4, a 24-hour time lock (86,400 s) and no separate config authority, so membership and threshold changes also pass through the multisig. It has nine members: six with full initiate/vote/execute rights, one vote-only and two initiate-only, which makes it 4-of-7 voters. The latest upgrade (5KexwF…, 2026-08-18) collected four approvals (LoTy38…, bs1PuR…, 4NJCNi…, A35RFX…), the last at 2026-08-17T20:47Z, and executed 24 h 07 min later. The first upgrade (2025-02-27) executed about two minutes after its proposal was created, so the time lock was not yet in force at launch. When it was added was not traced. Membership has changed: 26Es6M… and 4PvYpg… executed upgrades up to 2025-12-22 and 2026-05-14, and neither is a current member. Twice the authority sat with a single keypair, B8yKMPzag6PJ8EhGAWqCbWpTiRc64yBuSbfXA9kHmUi3, the deployer: for 48 s at deployment and for 45 min on 2025-12-22, when the multisig handed it over and the keypair handed it back. No upgrade happened during either window. The members' beneficial identities are not published on-chain. Open source ↗
protocol-api: 2 Loopscale lending vaults accept this exact mint as collateral. Open source ↗

Referenced accounts and owners

Role	Address	Existence check	Expected owner	Observed program owner
borrow-vault	`31vgw6Bvg7AtiQb8RJmdYohvVVASQ9zGmGu33AhYe6pH`	exists	`Not established`	`1oopBoJG58DgkUVKkEzKgyG9dvRmpgeEm1AVjoHkF78`
borrow-vault	`3Poc8EoDyTdtLXf4AUQf3dHvaxUJNb1wspRkizrbe5jR`	exists	`Not established`	`1oopBoJG58DgkUVKkEzKgyG9dvRmpgeEm1AVjoHkF78`
loan-account	`2TrjqvbYqmq7uqizeycSWfBFfH5zNNqX6dGJyVWGy7n8`	exists	`1oopBoJG58DgkUVKkEzKgyG9dvRmpgeEm1AVjoHkF78`	`1oopBoJG58DgkUVKkEzKgyG9dvRmpgeEm1AVjoHkF78`
loan-account	`8FVLU7irU1MpbK8zpwKeHwnnwMhFg7ViFaMPbx6pVify`	exists	`1oopBoJG58DgkUVKkEzKgyG9dvRmpgeEm1AVjoHkF78`	`1oopBoJG58DgkUVKkEzKgyG9dvRmpgeEm1AVjoHkF78`

The source data records observed owners. Where the source publishes no expected owner, the expected owner is not established. Account existence and owner confirm the published reference; they do not decode configuration or prove that a user action can succeed.

Recorded parameters

Maximum LTV: 60%
Liquidation LTV: 75%
Liquidation penalty: Not reported
Configured / observed size: $1,802.29
24 h volume: Not reported
24 h transactions: Not reported
Oracle: Not reported

Markets and configured addresses

Loopscale loan 2Trj…y7n8
2TrjqvbYqmq7uqizeycSWfBFfH5zNNqX6dGJyVWGy7n8
Debt mint: EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v (USDC)
Watch this exact market →
Loopscale loan 8FVL…Vify
8FVLU7irU1MpbK8zpwKeHwnnwMhFg7ViFaMPbx6pVify
Debt mint: EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v (USDC)
Watch this exact market →
USDG Orca (lends USDG)
31vgw6Bvg7AtiQb8RJmdYohvVVASQ9zGmGu33AhYe6pH
Debt mint: 2u1tszSeqZ3qBWF3uNGPFc8TzMk2tdiwknnRMWGWjGWH (USDG)
Watch this exact market →
USDC Orca (lends USDC)
3Poc8EoDyTdtLXf4AUQf3dHvaxUJNb1wspRkizrbe5jR
Debt mint: EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v (USDC)
Watch this exact market →

Custody and default outcomes

Borrower default / seizure

The lender can seize and sell; redemption is gated

The token is a transferable bearer ledger-based security, so the contract can transfer or sell it after default while the mint is open. Direct redemption for cash is not autonomous: the lender must pass KYC/AML and the issuer may reject a request on negative findings.

Protocol hack custody

Clawback may reverse a theft

The permanent delegate and pause authority can technically contain or reverse a hacked transfer. Assistance is discretionary rather than a protocol right, and the same powers can reverse the protocol's own custody or liquidation outcome.

Access or key loss

Issuer action can rescue a stranded token

The permanent delegate can technically move or burn a balance in an inaccessible account. A replacement or redemption still depends on the issuer accepting the claimant, completing compliance checks and exercising that power.

These conclusions come from the issuer and control recipe from the matched legal template. They are not protocol simulation results.

Lender exit after receiving the token

Conditional market exit — A source-listed collateral market and observed on-chain pool indicate a possible route, but execution was not independently tested and issuer controls, transfer conditions, or thin liquidity may prevent full realisation.

Observed DEX liquidity: $4,870,446.25
Issuer redemption established: yes
Key limit: Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.