← All protocol dossiersSource fetched 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
SPYon × Meteora
Exact-token support is source-listed The protocol or product source names this exact token. No configuration decoding or read-only execution simulation was performed.
Source-described use: Swap the token or provide liquidity in 1 observed Meteora pool.
Open SPYon token report · Open ondo-global-markets issuer dossier
Exact token and source-described action
- Solana token address
k18WJUULWheRkSpSquYGdNNmtuE2Vbw1hpuUi92ondo- Actions described by source
- swap, provide-liquidity
- Source-reported integration status
- live
- Access limits
- No access condition was recorded.
- Direct links
- Open market / product ↗
Proof status — do not read a source listing as execution proof
- Achieved proof stage
- source-listed
- Source proof status
- exact-token-registry
- Source fetched
- 2026-09-22T12:27:16Z
- Activity observed
- An activity indicator was observed; its stated basis is volume24Usd, txns24. Reported metrics are not independently executed trades.
- Account existence
- checked (1/1 referenced accounts)
- Configuration decoded
- Not performed
- Read-only execution simulation
- Not performed
Source evidence
- protocol-api: 1 pool also resolved in Meteora’s own per-pool API. Open source ↗
Referenced accounts and owners
The current source data records observed owners, not a separately published expected-owner assertion; where no such assertion exists, it remains not established. Account existence and owner corroborate the published reference but do not independently decode configuration or prove a user action can succeed.
Recorded parameters
- Maximum LTV
- Not reported
- Liquidation LTV
- Not reported
- Liquidation penalty
- Not reported
- Configured / observed size
- $14,525.46
- 24 h volume
- $143.19
- 24 h transactions
- 2
- Oracle
- Not reported
Markets and configured addresses
- Market / pool
cNPfiL8eVbyqFMEETRrnUUDbfaVLbmj1gR4fk9294We
Custody and default outcomes
Borrower default / seizure
On-chain seizure works; redemption is gated
The protocol can transfer or sell the balance after default while transfers are open. A lender seeking cash redemption must satisfy the issuer's KYC/AML process, so autonomous liquidation depends on secondary-market depth rather than an unconditional redemption rail.
Protocol hack custody
The issuer can stop, but not directly reverse
The pause and freeze authorities can immobilise affected accounts and halt transfers. No permanent delegate is present, so the observed mint controls do not themselves let the issuer extract a stolen balance; cancellation or reissue would require a separate legal and operational process.
Access or key loss
Freezing does not unlock a stranded account
The issuer can freeze the inaccessible account but cannot transfer from it with the observed extensions. Recovery would require an evidenced cancellation/reissue process outside the escrow contract, and none is treated here as automatic.
These are issuer-plus-control-recipe conclusions from the matched legal template — not protocol simulation results.
Lender exit after receiving the token
Conditional market exit — The lender can use a checked on-chain sale route, but issuer controls, transfer conditions, or thin liquidity may prevent full realisation.
- Observed DEX liquidity
- $14,525.46
- Issuer redemption established
- yes
- Key limit
- Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.