← All protocol dossiersSource fetched 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
GLXY × Kamino
We read this market’s settings for this exact token on-chain Evidence for this stage was checked 2026-10-11T06:39:05Z. The protocol’s registry or product page names this exact token. Reading the settings does not prove a transaction would go through.
Source-described use: Post this exact mint as collateral in a configured Kamino market and borrow an eligible debt asset against it.
Open GLXY token report · Open superstate-opening-bell issuer dossier
Exact token and source-described action
- Solana token address
2HehXG149TXuVptQhbiWAWDjbbuCsXSAtLTB5wc2aajK- Actions described by source
- collateral, borrow
- Source-reported integration status
- available
- Access limits
- Only Superstate-verified, allowlisted holders and protocol accounts can use the market.
- Direct links
- Open market / product ↗ · Protocol documentation ↗
Proof status: a source listing does not prove execution
- Achieved proof stage
- decoded
- Source proof status
- exact-token-registry
- Source fetched
- 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
- Activity observed
- Any figures shown are what the protocol reports, not trades we made or checked.
- Account existence
- checked (2/2 referenced accounts)
- Configuration decoded
- Performed — Reserve risk configuration (status, maximum LTV, liquidation threshold, liquidation bonus) of 1 collateral reserve read from the chain; debt-side terms and executions are not decoded. Decoded at slot 455555054 with stocks/lib/kamino-accounts.mjs (offsets verified against @kamino-finance/klend-sdk 12.0.0).
- Read-only execution simulation
- Not performed
Source evidence
- protocol-api: 1 live registry row match this exact collateral mint. Open source ↗
Referenced accounts and owners
The source data records observed owners. Where the source publishes no expected owner, the expected owner is not established. Account existence and owner confirm the published reference; they do not decode configuration or prove that a user action can succeed.
Recorded parameters
- Maximum LTV
- 30%
- Liquidation LTV
- 45%
- Liquidation penalty
- Not reported
- Configured / observed size
- $0
- 24 h volume
- Not reported
- 24 h transactions
- Not reported
- Oracle
- Not reported
Markets and configured addresses
Custody and default outcomes
Borrower default / seizure
The share can move only to an eligible owner
A liquidation cannot send the registered share to an arbitrary buyer or AMM. The lender or buyer must be eligible and reflected in the register, so enforcement depends on transfer-agent cooperation even though the collateral is a real share.
Protocol hack custody
The register and clawback support intervention
The transfer agent can freeze accounts and use the permanent delegate to move or burn balances after a hack. That can preserve the registered owner's rights, but makes an on-chain protocol's possession non-final.
Access or key loss
Registered ownership can survive key loss
Because the shareholder is identified on the register, the transfer agent can potentially cancel or move a stranded token and preserve the share. The protocol cannot trigger that remedy without the transfer agent accepting the claim.
These conclusions come from the issuer and control recipe from the matched legal template. They are not protocol simulation results.
Lender exit after receiving the token
Issuer-dependent exit — Code can hold the balance, but seizure or realisation still depends on issuer recognition, allowlisting, or a claim weaker than possession suggests.
- Observed DEX liquidity
- Not reported
- Issuer redemption established
- yes
- Key limit
- Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.