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Source fetched 2026-10-11T06:39:07Z

GLXY × Kamino

We read this market’s settings for this exact token on-chain Evidence for this stage was checked 2026-10-11T06:39:05Z. The protocol’s registry or product page names this exact token. Reading the settings does not prove a transaction would go through.

Source-described use: Post this exact mint as collateral in a configured Kamino market and borrow an eligible debt asset against it.

Open GLXY token report · Open superstate-opening-bell issuer dossier

Exact token and source-described action

Solana token address
2HehXG149TXuVptQhbiWAWDjbbuCsXSAtLTB5wc2aajK
Actions described by source
collateral, borrow
Source-reported integration status
available
Access limits
Only Superstate-verified, allowlisted holders and protocol accounts can use the market.
Direct links
Open market / product ↗ · Protocol documentation ↗

Proof status: a source listing does not prove execution

Achieved proof stage
decoded
Source proof status
exact-token-registry
Source fetched
2026-10-11T06:39:07Z
Activity observed
Any figures shown are what the protocol reports, not trades we made or checked.
Account existence
checked (2/2 referenced accounts)
Configuration decoded
Performed — Reserve risk configuration (status, maximum LTV, liquidation threshold, liquidation bonus) of 1 collateral reserve read from the chain; debt-side terms and executions are not decoded. Decoded at slot 455555054 with stocks/lib/kamino-accounts.mjs (offsets verified against @kamino-finance/klend-sdk 12.0.0).
Read-only execution simulation
Not performed

Source evidence

Referenced accounts and owners

RoleAddressExistence checkExpected ownerObserved program owner
collateral-reserve4v8hN3DgJ86qH1KBr9PCKSgi3t8F1MJc7n6Wzsbw1C6gexistsNot establishedKLend2g3cP87fffoy8q1mQqGKjrxjC8boSyAYavgmjD
lending-marketCF32kn7AY8X1bW7ZkGcHc4X9ZWTxqKGCJk6QwrQkDcdwexistsNot establishedKLend2g3cP87fffoy8q1mQqGKjrxjC8boSyAYavgmjD

The source data records observed owners. Where the source publishes no expected owner, the expected owner is not established. Account existence and owner confirm the published reference; they do not decode configuration or prove that a user action can succeed.

Recorded parameters

Maximum LTV
30%
Liquidation LTV
45%
Liquidation penalty
Not reported
Configured / observed size
$0
24 h volume
Not reported
24 h transactions
Not reported
Oracle
Not reported

Markets and configured addresses

Custody and default outcomes

Borrower default / seizure

The share can move only to an eligible owner

A liquidation cannot send the registered share to an arbitrary buyer or AMM. The lender or buyer must be eligible and reflected in the register, so enforcement depends on transfer-agent cooperation even though the collateral is a real share.

Protocol hack custody

The register and clawback support intervention

The transfer agent can freeze accounts and use the permanent delegate to move or burn balances after a hack. That can preserve the registered owner's rights, but makes an on-chain protocol's possession non-final.

Access or key loss

Registered ownership can survive key loss

Because the shareholder is identified on the register, the transfer agent can potentially cancel or move a stranded token and preserve the share. The protocol cannot trigger that remedy without the transfer agent accepting the claim.

These conclusions come from the issuer and control recipe from the matched legal template. They are not protocol simulation results.

Lender exit after receiving the token

Issuer-dependent exit — Code can hold the balance, but seizure or realisation still depends on issuer recognition, allowlisting, or a claim weaker than possession suggests.

Observed DEX liquidity
Not reported
Issuer redemption established
yes
Key limit
Possession of the token does not itself establish eligibility, issuer recognition, redemption access, or enough executable market liquidity.