Undocumented.
Understand ownership →Issuer programme dossier
Remora Markets
Undocumented.
The short answer
Documented at programme level. See complete terms.
Understand redemption →Control is listed as observed powers, with no single score.
Understand issuer powers →No proof-of-reserve report, feed or oracle was found from any primary source.
Understand insolvency protection →How it works, step by step
Each numbered step cites where it comes from. Colour shows how we know it; a dashed step is not established.
Remora Markets (defunct): every exit has closed
Mint-and-redeem, then a DEX exit pool — neither works today.- observed seen by our own checks — on-chain unless the source says otherwise
- documented the issuer’s or a regulator’s own words
Steps as text
- Originally: mint and redeem against USDC on Solana documented Source: Remora Markets dossier (redemption.rails)
- After the wind-down: an exit-liquidity pool on Manifest, routed via Jupiter/Titan documented Source: Remora Markets dossier (redemption.rails)
- Now: no rail functions — Jupiter will not quote the tokens observed Source: Our re-check of Jupiter quotes and pools — 2026-09-18
Remora Markets: who is involved
Every party the dossier names, and how it relates to the programme.- documented the issuer’s or a regulator’s own words
- not established drawn dashed: nothing found settles it
Relations as text
- Issues the token (the legal wrapper): none named unknown Source: No party named in the dossier — parties.tokenIssuers
- Runs the tokenization for it: Step Finance, Step Labs LLC documented Source: holder.io — article body
- Keeps the share register: none named unknown Source: No party named in the dossier — parties.transferAgents
- Holds the underlying: none named unknown Source: No party named in the dossier — parties.custodians
- Distributes or lists it: Manifest, Jupiter documented Source: solanacompass.com — section heading 'The wind-down'
- Programme is owned by: Step Finance documented Source: solanacompass.com — section heading 'What it demonstrated'
- Offered to: non-US persons, KYC-verified platform users documented Source: holder.io — article body
What if a part of the chain fails?
We put 38 failure scenarios (stolen keys, custodian insolvency, a frozen token, regulator action) to this programme in the same words as every other issuer. Documented means the issuer’s or a regulator’s own words address the case; inferred is our reading of the structure.
- 9 documented
- 21 inferred
- 0 litigated
- 6 unknown
- 2 not applicable
See this programme in the failure-scenario matrix →Read every answer in the issuer panel →
What happens if…
Six of the scenarios, drawn: where the failure starts, how it reaches the holder, and what this programme’s documents say happens next.
What if… My private keys are stolen and the tokens are moved.
Remora Markets — answer inferred.- inferred our reading of the structure
- scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
- Holder My private keys are stolen and the tokens are moved. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — keys-stolen
- Holder → Tokenization provider Who could act on it: the “Transfer and control” chain scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: transfer
- Holder Nothing can be recovered and nobody is left to ask. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — defaultAccountState {accountState: initialized}, no transferHook extension; freezeAuthority and permanentDelegate both DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb
- Holder No lost-token, replacement or reissuance procedure survives in any readable source — the 2025 legal pages were put up empty, the 2026 Privacy Policy says nothing on it, and the 2026 Terms of Use was never archived — and there is no allowlist or transfer hook on any rToken mint, so a thief's wallet receives and re-sends the tokens freely. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — defaultAccountState {accountState: initialized}, no transferHook extension; freezeAuthority and permanentDelegate both DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb
- Holder The freeze and permanent-delegate powers that could in principle have frozen the stolen balance still exist on-chain but the operator wound down in February 2026 and no contactable party holds them. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — defaultAccountState {accountState: initialized}, no transferHook extension; freezeAuthority and permanentDelegate both DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb
What if… The mint, freeze or delegate authority key is compromised or lost.
Remora Markets — answer inferred.- inferred our reading of the structure
- scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
- Token program and keys The mint, freeze or delegate authority key is compromised or lost. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — authority-key-compromised
- Token program and keys → Holder Reaches the holder along “Transfer and control” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: transfer
- Holder Everything sits on one address: mint, freeze, pause, permanent-delegate, metadata and rebase authority for every rToken are the same key, so whoever controls it can mint unbacked supply, freeze the whole float, seize any balance and rewrite the token's own metadata. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — mintAuthority, freezeAuthority, metadataPointer.authority, pausableConfig.authority, permanentDelegate.delegate and scaledUiAmountConfig.authority are all DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb (2026-09-18)
- Holder No key-custody statement, incident-response policy, rotation history or insurance was ever published, and no recovery path exists now. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — mintAuthority, freezeAuthority, metadataPointer.authority, pausableConfig.authority, permanentDelegate.delegate and scaledUiAmountConfig.authority are all DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb (2026-09-18)
- Holder The parent's January 2026 compromise came through executive devices and reportedly did not reach this key. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — mintAuthority, freezeAuthority, metadataPointer.authority, pausableConfig.authority, permanentDelegate.delegate and scaledUiAmountConfig.authority are all DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb (2026-09-18)
What if… The custodian or prime broker holding the shares goes bankrupt.
Remora Markets — answer not established.- not established drawn dashed: nothing found settles it
- scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
- Custodian or prime broker The custodian or prime broker holding the shares goes bankrupt. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — custodian-insolvency
- Custodian or prime broker → Holder Reaches the holder along “Ownership of the underlying” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: ownership
- Holder We could not establish who the custodian was, so we cannot say whether the shares and metals were client property, insured, or part of an estate. not established Source: web.archive.org — section heading 'COMPLIANCE AND SECURITY', third bullet: 'Custodial services managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'
- Holder The only disclosure ever made was that custodial services were 'managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE' — no name, no jurisdiction beyond that, no account type, no sub-custodian chain and no investor-protection scheme. not established Source: web.archive.org — section heading 'COMPLIANCE AND SECURITY', third bullet: 'Custodial services managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'
- Holder A holder facing a custodian failure would not know which firm had failed. not established Source: web.archive.org — section heading 'COMPLIANCE AND SECURITY', third bullet: 'Custodial services managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'
What if… The token issuer goes bankrupt.
Remora Markets — answer documented.- documented the issuer’s or a regulator’s own words
- scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
- Token issuer The token issuer goes bankrupt. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — issuer-insolvency
- Token issuer → Holder Reaches the holder along “Ownership of the underlying” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: ownership
- Holder There was no insolvency estate and no process to claim in: Step Finance failed to raise or sell and simply stopped, taking the platform with it. documented Source: solanacompass.com — section heading 'A Proof Point Cut Short'
- Holder Nothing bankruptcy-remote was ever disclosed — no SPV, trust, security interest or ring-fencing — and Solana Compass names the structural cause plainly. documented Source: solanacompass.com — section heading 'A Proof Point Cut Short'
- Holder The only thing holders were given was an open DEX pool at a stale price; there was no administrator, no waterfall, no claims window and no communication after it. documented Source: solanacompass.com — section heading 'A Proof Point Cut Short'
What if… The company is acquired or merged, for cash or for shares.
Remora Markets — answer inferred.- inferred our reading of the structure
- scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
- Underlying company The company is acquired or merged, for cash or for shares. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — company-acquired
- Underlying company → Holder Reaches the holder along “Corporate actions” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: corporate-actions
- Holder Nothing would reach you. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — scaledUiAmountConfig {authority: DQSTm2Wt…, multiplier: 1, newMultiplier: 1, newMultiplierEffectiveTimestamp: 0} (read 2026-09-18)
- Holder No corporate-action policy was ever published, the only on-chain adjustment mechanism the mints carry has never been used, and the operator that would have had to receive merger consideration and pass it on no longer exists. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — scaledUiAmountConfig {authority: DQSTm2Wt…, multiplier: 1, newMultiplier: 1, newMultiplierEffectiveTimestamp: 0} (read 2026-09-18)
- Holder Cash or stock paid to whoever holds the underlying shares stops there; the rToken would keep trading as a claim on an event nobody processes. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — scaledUiAmountConfig {authority: DQSTm2Wt…, multiplier: 1, newMultiplier: 1, newMultiplierEffectiveTimestamp: 0} (read 2026-09-18)
What if… The company is delisted or goes private.
Remora Markets — answer inferred.- inferred our reading of the structure
- scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
- Underlying company The company is delisted or goes private. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — company-delisted
- Underlying company → Holder Reaches the holder along “Corporate actions” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: corporate-actions
- Holder The token does not terminate and no final valuation happens, because there is no mechanism and no operator to run one. inferred Source: web.archive.org — the whole page — published with a 'Terms & Conditions' heading and no body text, so no delisting, termination or final-valuation clause exists
- Holder No delisting or termination clause was ever published; the rToken simply continues to exist on-chain as a balance whose reference price stops being observable, and the practical consequence — no venue, no quote, no redemption — has already arrived for all five rStocks regardless of what the underlying companies do. inferred Source: web.archive.org — the whole page — published with a 'Terms & Conditions' heading and no body text, so no delisting, termination or final-valuation clause exists
Technology + legal templates
These conclusions apply only to the exact programme and observed control recipe shown.
- No reviewed technology + legal template is published for this programme yet.
Current Solana assets
0 exact token addresses currently inherit this issuer-level analysis unless an asset card records an exception. Watch this issuer programme →
- No current Solana token address is recorded for this programme.
Legal claim and issuing chain
- Issuing entity
- unknown. No token document names a legal issuing entity. The only legal entity any primary source names is Step Labs LLC, which the 2026 remoramarkets.xyz Privacy Policy defines as "Remora Markets", "we" or "us" — the operator of the website and service — without giving its state or country of organisation, a registered address, a registration number, or any statement that it issued the rTokens. The platform was 'formerly Moose Capital', acquired by Step Finance in December 2024 and rebranded; Step Finance said it had integrated Moose Capital's team and regulatory licences, and the 2026 About page names the acquirer as 'Step Foundation'. The 2025 remora.markets site never named a company, and its Terms & Conditions, Whitepaper, KYC Info and Privacy Policy pages were published as empty stubs (verified in the Wayback captures of 2025-05-16); the 2026 site at remoramarkets.xyz listed four legal pages in its sitemap and footer menu (Privacy Policy, Terms of Use, Disclaimer, Service Providers; sitemap lastmod 2026-01-16), and only the Privacy Policy was ever archived with content: the Wayback Machine holds no capture of the Terms of Use, and its only captures of the Disclaimer and Service Providers pages (2026-03-11 and 2026-04-16) are redirects to the site's /not-available region-block page; archive.today holds nothing for the domain. Note: 'Remora Capital Corporation' (Maryland, SEC CIK 2045370) is a middle-market credit BDC and is NOT related, and nothing connects Step Labs LLC to the London-addressed 'Step Labs XYZ' of steplabs.xyz.
- Entity jurisdiction
- unknown. The one named entity, Step Labs LLC (the 2026 Privacy Policy's "Remora Markets"), is given no state or country of organisation and no address; the 'LLC' suffix is used by every US state and by several offshore registries, so it does not locate the company, and neither SEC EDGAR full-text search nor the GLEIF LEI register returns any entity of that name (2026-09-23). The 2025 About page claimed only an 'Asset management license in premium offshore jurisdictions' and that 'Custodial services [are] managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'; secondary reporting says Remora was registered in Canada and the UAE. Circumstantial support for the UAE: app.remora.markets is a CNAME to mooseprodapialb-2015871155.me-central-1.elb.amazonaws.com — an AWS load balancer in the UAE (me-central-1) region, whose name preserves the 'Moose' origin. Re-checked 2026-09-18 against both 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8: the CNAME record itself is STILL published, so this piece of circumstantial UAE evidence remains checkable; it is the AWS target that no longer exists, which is why an A lookup for app.remora.markets returns NXDOMAIN.
- Governing law
- unknown — no readable source states one. The 2025 remora.markets /terms-conditions/ page existed but contained no terms; the 2026 remoramarkets.xyz Terms of Use existed (listed in the sitemap and legal menu, and invoked by the Privacy Policy) but no archive holds its text; the archived 2026 Privacy Policy names Step Labs LLC but states no governing law, forum or dispute clause.
- Regulatory status
- unknown / self-asserted only. Claimed an unnamed offshore asset-management licence and UAE-regulated custodial providers; no regulator, licence number, prospectus or exemption was ever published. The platform was not available to users in the United States or Europe pending approvals, and required KYB for business users. The 2026 site enforced a region block — "our services are currently not available in your region due to regulatory requirements" — and its Privacy Policy said Step Labs LLC took no deliberate steps to direct the offering at individuals located in the USA or any other sanctioned or prohibited country; neither page names the regulation relied on.
- Holder claim
- Undocumented. In practice the holder held a platform-issued token that the operator asserted was backed 1:1 by the corresponding security or metal held through an unnamed regulated custodian, redeemable through the platform for USDC. No terms, prospectus or note conditions survive in any readable source — the 2025 legal pages were empty and the 2026 Terms of Use was never archived — so the legal nature, ranking and enforceability of the claim are unknown; the only contracting party a surviving document names is Step Labs LLC, as operator of the website. Post-wind-down the operator characterised it as a USDC redemption claim rather than a claim to the share.
- Underlying custodian
- unknown — not named in any source that can still be read. The 2025 About page said only 'Custodial services managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'; the 2026 site at remoramarkets.xyz said each tokenized equity is 'held through a regulated custodian (see legal documentation)', and the Service Providers page of that legal documentation (remoramarkets.xyz/legal-documentation/service-providers) was never archived with content: the Wayback Machine's only two captures, 2026-03-11 and 2026-04-16, are redirects to the site's /not-available region block. A BitGo custody attribution sourced to https://remoramarkets.xyz/proof-of-reserves cannot be corroborated: that domain stopped resolving between 2026-08-14 (the last Wayback capture the host answered) and 2026-09-16 (the first failed check), and neither the Wayback Machine (476 captures of the domain, none of a proof-of-reserves path) nor archive.today holds a copy of the page (checked 2026-09-23). 'unknown' rests on the About page and on the absence of any naming source, not on the dead page, so it stands.
Shareholder rights
| Right | For the token holder | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Dividends | Not stated | No terms survive; the programme wound down in February 2026.Source: solanacompass.com · section 'The product' |
| Voting | Not stated | No terms survive.Source: solanacompass.com · section 'The product' |
| Reports & meetings | Not stated | No terms survive.Source: solanacompass.com · section 'The product' |
| Splits | Not stated | The mints could rebase but never did; no policy was published.Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com · rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe extension scaledUiAmountConfig · “multiplier: 1, newMultiplier: 1, newMultiplierEffectiveTimestamp: 0” |
| Takeovers | Not stated | No terms survive.Source: solanacompass.com · section 'The product' |
Who can exercise token controls
No installed authority path was established from the supplied token observation.
This is the representative current exact-token recipe. Open the technology + legal templates above for recipe differences. Programme and PDA labels are traced to the effective signer where reviewed evidence permits. Thresholds apply only to the named role; initiate-only members are not counted as voters.
Redemption and holder eligibility
Programme-level answer. Product examples remain labelled and do not establish another token’s terms.
- Contractual right
- Nodocumented
- Eligible holder and route
- documented
Documented at programme level. See complete terms.
Originally: hold a Remora platform account (KYC for individuals, KYB for businesses); deposit USDC to mint, redeem through the platform. Post-wind-down: the operator said it was 'developing a redemption process for holders to exchange for USDC', and on 2026-03-02 deployed exit liquidity on Manifest DEX priced at the prior Friday's market close, reachable through the Jupiter and Titan swap routers — i.e. open to any token holder via a DEX rather than a contractual redemption right. Re-checked 2026-09-18: that route is gone too. Jupiter, the router the wind-down told holders to use, refuses to quote the rTokens at all (TOKEN_NOT_TRADABLE on TSLAr, GLDr, SPYr and CRCLr; NVDAr, which still answered NO_ROUTES_FOUND on 2026-09-18, answers TOKEN_NOT_TRADABLE too on the 2026-09-23 re-read), the Manifest exit book appears in no aggregator's pool list, and the only pools left are the original 2025 trading pools holding $13.47 across four TSLAr pools, $0.30 on GLDr and $1,040.51 on NVDAr at zero 24-hour volume except $370.99 on NVDAr/USDC. There is no redemption right, no redemption process and now no market: redemption.available is recorded false.
- KYC / AML
- Yesdocumented
- Minimum
- documented
Documented at programme level. See complete terms.
unknown — fractional shares supported (9 decimals)
- Fees
- documented
Documented at programme level. See complete terms.
unknown
- Timing and settlement asset
- documented
Documented at programme level. See complete terms.
Originally USDC on Solana (mint and redeem); post-wind-down, a DEX exit-liquidity pool on Manifest routed via Jupiter/Titan. As of 2026-09-18 no rail functions: Jupiter will not quote the mints and the residual Raydium pools hold double-digit dollars. Withdrawal of the token itself to self-custody still works, which is not a redemption rail.
- Route currently available
- Not establishedunknown
- Successful redemption independently observed
- Not establishedunknown
- Secondary-market exit
- Asset-specific; inspect the exact-token report for current venues and liquidity.
- Timing / SLA
- Not established
- Transfer mechanism
- permanent-delegate
- US persons excluded
- Yes
Who keeps the price honest
Programme-level answer: who can create and redeem at the issuer, so a reader knows whether a token’s premium can be arbitraged away.
No one can create or redeem, so nothing ties the price to the share: it is what the last trade paid. There is no market left either.
- Who can create and redeem
- No one: Remora wound down in February 2026. The platform that minted and redeemed is offline and the exit pool it pointed holders to is gone.
- How
- None.
- How fast
- None.
- When
- None.
- Minimum
- None
- Cost
- None
- Shares or cash
- No.
Read on 2026-09-30 from the issuer’s redemption terms; the terms and their sources are under Can a holder redeem?.
Backing, custody and insolvency
- Collateral ratio
- 1:1
- Composition
- shares
- Rehypothecation
- undisclosed
- Bankruptcy remote
- Not established
- Security interest
- Not established
- Verification type
- none
- Verification agent
- unknown
- Verification frequency
- Claimed 'Monthly Proof of Reserve audits' on the About page; no auditor named, no report ever located
- Verification notes
- No proof-of-reserve report, feed or oracle was found from any primary source. The only reserve figure the issuer ever displayed was its own 'CUSTODIED SHARES' column beside 'TOKEN SUPPLY' on the 2026 products page (Wayback capture of 2026-01-29; e.g. TSLAr 3,079 / 3,079), with no custodian, date or attestor. There is no Chainlink PoR feed, no attestation firm named, and no API. Post-wind-down the operator merely asserted that 'all rTokens are still fully backed at a 1:1 ratio' with no supporting evidence. The claim of monthly third-party PoR audits should be treated as unverified marketing, not an attestation.
Corporate actions and economics
Fees, who gets paid and long-term incentives → · Initial programme research; coverage gaps are marked.
- Corporate actions
- unknown. The mints carry the Token-2022 scaledUiAmountConfig extension — the same mechanism xStocks uses for rebasing dividends and splits — but the multiplier is 1 with no scheduled change on every mint inspected (TSLAr, NVDAr, GLDr), so no rebasing had ever been applied. No dividend, split or delisting policy was ever published.
- Pricing
- reference market: platform-mark · notes: Minting was priced at 'the current price on traditional exchanges' per the platform's own How It Works page — a platform mark, with no named oracle. Arbitrage depended entirely on the platform's mint/redeem window being open to the arbitrageur, which required an account; that window is now closed. The wind-down exit liquidity was priced off the prior Friday's market close, i.e. a stale mark. Third-party valuations disagree THREE ways for the same platform within a day, across more than two orders of magnitude: CoinGecko's 'Remora Markets Tokenized rStocks' category reports a ~$138.9M aggregate market cap, RWA.xyz reported $1.87M distributed asset value on 17 September 2026 ($2.13M on 24 September), and DefiLlama reported $479,846 on 18 September ($296,074 on 24 September, after a one-day $2,834,038 data point dated 20 September). Nor is any one of them self-consistent: DefiLlama's own daily series records $0 on 42 days between 2026-07-02 and 2026-09-10 before returning to $479,846, and its own record has flagged the protocol dead since 2026-02-23 while it keeps publishing a daily figure. Treat all third-party valuation figures for these tokens as unreliable.
Primary documents and evidence
- About Remora (compliance and custody claims) — archived
- How It Works (USDC deposit, mint at exchange price, withdraw to non-custodial wallet) — archived
- Terms & Conditions — page existed but was published EMPTY (no terms) — archived
- Whitepaper — page existed but was published EMPTY — archived
- KYC Info — page existed but was published EMPTY — archived
- Remora Markets project review, launch dates, shutdown timeline, rToken list
- Step Finance hack and wind-down timeline
- Three Step Finance projects shut down; Remora says rTokens redeemable 1:1 for USDC
- Step Finance acquires Moose Capital, launches Remora Markets
- RWA.xyz platform page (live residual metrics)
- Privacy Policy — the FOURTH legal page published EMPTY (h1 only, empty page-content div) — archived
- Page sitemap — dates all four empty legal pages to a 25-second burst on 2025-02-25 and shows they were never edited again — archived
- DefiLlama protocol series — the third and lowest of the three disagreeing valuations ($479,846) and the only one whose own history records $0 for 42 days of the last quarter
- Privacy Policy, remoramarkets.xyz (2026) — names Step Labs LLC as "Remora Markets"; US non-targeting statement; no governing law — archived
- Sitemap, remoramarkets.xyz (2026) — lists Privacy Policy, Terms of Use, Disclaimer and Service Providers (lastmod 2026-01-16); only the Privacy Policy was archived with content — archived
- Region-block page, remoramarkets.xyz (2026) — "not available in your region due to regulatory requirements"; the Disclaimer and Service Providers captures redirect here — archived
Open research questions (7)
- What is the actual issuing legal entity and its jurisdiction? No token document names it; the only entity a primary source names is 'Step Labs LLC ("Remora Markets", "we" or "us")', the data controller in the 2026 remoramarkets.xyz Privacy Policy (https://web.archive.org/web/20260129134841/https://remoramarkets.xyz/legal-documentation/privacy-policy), which gives no state of organisation and does not say that it issued the tokens; EDGAR full-text search and the GLEIF LEI register return nothing for the name. The parent is styled 'Step Finance' (2025) and 'Step Foundation' (2026), and the Step Finance website's own terms name Crossroads Events Inc under Panamanian law — nothing connects that company to Remora. Candidate lead: the former 'Moose Capital' entity, with UAE infrastructure (app.remora.markets CNAME to an AWS me-central-1 load balancer named 'mooseprodapialb') and secondary reporting of Canadian and UAE registration — none of which is a filing.
- Is the collateral still actually there? The 1:1 backing claim of 2026-02 has never been evidenced, and ~$2M of rTokens across ~3,600 holders is still outstanding as of 2026-09-16. Who now holds the underlying shares and metals, and under what mandate?
- ANSWERED (2026-09-18): no. The Manifest exit book does not appear in any aggregator's pool list for the rTokens, and Jupiter — the router the wind-down itself pointed holders at — refuses to quote them: TSLAr, GLDr, SPYr and CRCLr all return errorCode TOKEN_NOT_TRADABLE, and NVDAr, which returned NO_ROUTES_FOUND on 2026-09-18, returns TOKEN_NOT_TRADABLE as well on the 2026-09-23 re-read. What is left are the original 2025 trading pools: $13.47 of TVL across four TSLAr pools, $0.30 on GLDr and $1,040.51 on NVDAr, at zero 24-hour volume except $370.99 on NVDAr/USDC (api-v3.raydium.io, 2026-09-18). Residual holders have no exit at all, which is why redemption.available is now recorded false.
- Who controls the key DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb after the wind-down, and was it ever in scope of the January 2026 device compromise? It can still freeze, pause, mint and seize every rToken.
- Why does CoinGecko's 'Remora Markets Tokenized rStocks' category report a ~$138.9M aggregate market cap with R-prefixed tickers (RTSLA, RCRCL, RGOOGL, RMU, RINTC) when the on-chain mints use r-suffixed tickers (TSLAr, CRCLr) and RWA.xyz reports $1.99M for the same platform on the same date? At least one aggregator is describing something other than these mints, or using stale/unreliable prices.
- The brief's premise that Remora is 'listed on Jupiter's stocks tag' no longer holds: as of 2026-09-16 Jupiter's stocks/rwa/equities tags contain xStocks and Ondo tokens, while the rTokens carry only 'community-assist'/'token-2022'/'unknown'. When were they de-tagged, and by whom?
- Did Remora ever publish a single proof-of-reserve report? None was found; if one exists it would materially change thirdPartyAttestations. The 2026 site's Terms of Use, Disclaimer and Service Providers pages were listed in its sitemap and legal menu but never archived with content (the Terms of Use was never captured; the other two only as post-wind-down redirects to the region-block page), so what they said about custody, reserves, redemption, liability or governing law cannot be read.