RWA SonarNew

Issuer programme dossier

Remora Markets

Undocumented.

defunctspv-claim-redeemable0 exact Solana tokensclaim rung 3 · beneficial interest in the security
Observed24 Sep 2026 15:26 UTC Coverage36 of 46 required fields sourced Basis97 structured claims · current reviewed understanding LimitUnknown means not established, never “no”

The short answer

Can the issuer intervene?No listed override is active in the observed token recipes.

Control is listed as observed powers, with no single score.

Understand issuer powers →

How it works, step by step

Each numbered step cites where it comes from. Colour shows how we know it; a dashed step is not established.

Remora Markets (defunct): every exit has closed

Mint-and-redeem, then a DEX exit pool — neither works today.
Remora Markets (defunct): every exit has closed3 numbered steps, top to bottom. 1. Originally: mint and redeem against USDC on Solana (documented) 2. After the wind-down: an exit-liquidity pool on Manifest, routed via Jupiter/Titan (documented) 3. Now: no rail functions — Jupiter will not quote the tokens (observed)1Originally: mint and redeem against USDCon Solana2After the wind-down: an exit-liquiditypool on Manifest, routed via Jupiter/Titan3Now: no rail functions — Jupiter will notquote the tokens
  • observed seen by our own checks — on-chain unless the source says otherwise
  • documented the issuer’s or a regulator’s own words
Steps as text
  1. Originally: mint and redeem against USDC on Solana documented Source: Remora Markets dossier (redemption.rails)
  2. After the wind-down: an exit-liquidity pool on Manifest, routed via Jupiter/Titan documented Source: Remora Markets dossier (redemption.rails)
  3. Now: no rail functions — Jupiter will not quote the tokens observed Source: Our re-check of Jupiter quotes and pools — 2026-09-18

Remora Markets: who is involved

Every party the dossier names, and how it relates to the programme.
Remora Markets: who is involvedRemora Markets and 7 relations. Issues the token (the legal wrapper): none named; Runs the tokenization for it: Step Finance, Step Labs LLC; Keeps the share register: none named; Holds the underlying: none named; Distributes or lists it: Manifest, Jupiter; Programme is owned by: Step Finance; Offered to: non-US persons, KYC-verified platform usersRemora MarketsunknownIssues the token (the legal wrapper)none namedRuns the tokenization for itStep Finance, Step Labs LLCKeeps the share registernone namedHolds the underlyingnone namedDistributes or lists itManifest, JupiterProgramme is owned byStep FinanceOffered tonon-US persons, KYC-verified platformusers
  • documented the issuer’s or a regulator’s own words
  • not established drawn dashed: nothing found settles it
Relations as text

What if a part of the chain fails?

We put 38 failure scenarios (stolen keys, custodian insolvency, a frozen token, regulator action) to this programme in the same words as every other issuer. Documented means the issuer’s or a regulator’s own words address the case; inferred is our reading of the structure.

What happens if…

Six of the scenarios, drawn: where the failure starts, how it reaches the holder, and what this programme’s documents say happens next.

What if… My private keys are stolen and the tokens are moved.

Remora Markets — answer inferred.
What if… My private keys are stolen and the tokens are moved.3 actors (Holder, Token program and keys, Tokenization provider); 5 numbered steps. 1. My private keys are stolen and the tokens are moved. (catalogue) 2. Who could act on it: the “Transfer and control” chain (catalogue) 3. Nothing can be recovered and nobody is left to ask. (inferred) 4. No lost-token, replacement or reissuance procedure survives in any readable source — the 2025 legal pages were put up empty, the 2026 Privacy Policy says nothing on it, and the 2026 Terms of Use was never archived — and there is no allowlist or transfer hook on any rToken mint, so a thief's wallet receives and re-sends the tokens freely. (inferred) 5. The freeze and permanent-delegate powers that could in principle have frozen the stolen balance still exist on-chain but the operator wound down in February 2026 and no contactable party holds them. (inferred)HolderToken programand keysTokenizationprovider1My private keys are stolen and the tokensare moved.2Who could act on it: the “Transfer andcontrol” chain3Nothing can be recovered and nobody is leftto ask.4No lost-token, replacement or reissuanceprocedure survives in any readable source —the 2025 legal pages were put up empty, the2026 Privacy Policy says nothing on it, andthe 2026 Terms of Use was never archived —and there is no allowlist or transfer hookon any rToken mint, so a thief's walletreceives and re-sends the tokens freely.5The freeze and permanent-delegate powersthat could in principle have frozen thestolen balance still exist on-chain but theoperator wound down in February 2026 and nocontactable party holds them.
  • inferred our reading of the structure
  • scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
  1. Holder My private keys are stolen and the tokens are moved. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — keys-stolen
  2. Holder → Tokenization provider Who could act on it: the “Transfer and control” chain scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: transfer
  3. Holder Nothing can be recovered and nobody is left to ask. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — defaultAccountState {accountState: initialized}, no transferHook extension; freezeAuthority and permanentDelegate both DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb
  4. Holder No lost-token, replacement or reissuance procedure survives in any readable source — the 2025 legal pages were put up empty, the 2026 Privacy Policy says nothing on it, and the 2026 Terms of Use was never archived — and there is no allowlist or transfer hook on any rToken mint, so a thief's wallet receives and re-sends the tokens freely. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — defaultAccountState {accountState: initialized}, no transferHook extension; freezeAuthority and permanentDelegate both DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb
  5. Holder The freeze and permanent-delegate powers that could in principle have frozen the stolen balance still exist on-chain but the operator wound down in February 2026 and no contactable party holds them. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — defaultAccountState {accountState: initialized}, no transferHook extension; freezeAuthority and permanentDelegate both DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb

What if… The mint, freeze or delegate authority key is compromised or lost.

Remora Markets — answer inferred.
What if… The mint, freeze or delegate authority key is compromised or lost.2 actors (Token program and keys, Holder); 5 numbered steps. 1. The mint, freeze or delegate authority key is compromised or lost. (catalogue) 2. Reaches the holder along “Transfer and control” (catalogue) 3. Everything sits on one address: mint, freeze, pause, permanent-delegate, metadata and rebase authority for every rToken are the same key, so whoever controls it can mint unbacked supply, freeze the whole float, seize any balance and rewrite the token's own metadata. (inferred) 4. No key-custody statement, incident-response policy, rotation history or insurance was ever published, and no recovery path exists now. (inferred) 5. The parent's January 2026 compromise came through executive devices and reportedly did not reach this key. (inferred)Token program and keysHolder1The mint, freeze or delegate authority keyis compromised or lost.2Reaches the holder along “Transfer andcontrol”3Everything sits on one address: mint,freeze, pause, permanent-delegate, metadataand rebase authority for every rToken arethe same key, so whoever controls it canmint unbacked supply, freeze the wholefloat, seize any balance and rewrite thetoken's own metadata.4No key-custody statement, incident-responsepolicy, rotation history or insurance wasever published, and no recovery path existsnow.5The parent's January 2026 compromise camethrough executive devices and reportedly didnot reach this key.
  • inferred our reading of the structure
  • scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
  1. Token program and keys The mint, freeze or delegate authority key is compromised or lost. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — authority-key-compromised
  2. Token program and keys → Holder Reaches the holder along “Transfer and control” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: transfer
  3. Holder Everything sits on one address: mint, freeze, pause, permanent-delegate, metadata and rebase authority for every rToken are the same key, so whoever controls it can mint unbacked supply, freeze the whole float, seize any balance and rewrite the token's own metadata. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — mintAuthority, freezeAuthority, metadataPointer.authority, pausableConfig.authority, permanentDelegate.delegate and scaledUiAmountConfig.authority are all DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb (2026-09-18)
  4. Holder No key-custody statement, incident-response policy, rotation history or insurance was ever published, and no recovery path exists now. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — mintAuthority, freezeAuthority, metadataPointer.authority, pausableConfig.authority, permanentDelegate.delegate and scaledUiAmountConfig.authority are all DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb (2026-09-18)
  5. Holder The parent's January 2026 compromise came through executive devices and reportedly did not reach this key. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — mintAuthority, freezeAuthority, metadataPointer.authority, pausableConfig.authority, permanentDelegate.delegate and scaledUiAmountConfig.authority are all DQSTm2WtpKBdpKx9t2cYL9Ja8fe7v4yEVEtA7NnSsdqb (2026-09-18)

What if… The custodian or prime broker holding the shares goes bankrupt.

Remora Markets — answer not established.
What if… The custodian or prime broker holding the shares goes bankrupt.4 actors (Custodian or prime broker, Token issuer, Token program and keys, Holder); 5 numbered steps. 1. The custodian or prime broker holding the shares goes bankrupt. (catalogue) 2. Reaches the holder along “Ownership of the underlying” (catalogue) 3. We could not establish who the custodian was, so we cannot say whether the shares and metals were client property, insured, or part of an estate. (unknown) 4. The only disclosure ever made was that custodial services were 'managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE' — no name, no jurisdiction beyond that, no account type, no sub-custodian chain and no investor-protection scheme. (unknown) 5. A holder facing a custodian failure would not know which firm had failed. (unknown)Custodianor primebrokerTokenissuerTokenprogram andkeysHolder1The custodian or prime broker holding theshares goes bankrupt.2Reaches the holder along “Ownership of theunderlying”3We could not establish who the custodianwas, so we cannot say whether the shares andmetals were client property, insured, orpart of an estate.?4The only disclosure ever made was thatcustodial services were 'managed by WealthManagement providers regulated in UAE' — noname, no jurisdiction beyond that, noaccount type, no sub-custodian chain and noinvestor-protection scheme.?5A holder facing a custodian failure wouldnot know which firm had failed.?
  • not established drawn dashed: nothing found settles it
  • scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
  1. Custodian or prime broker The custodian or prime broker holding the shares goes bankrupt. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — custodian-insolvency
  2. Custodian or prime broker → Holder Reaches the holder along “Ownership of the underlying” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: ownership
  3. Holder We could not establish who the custodian was, so we cannot say whether the shares and metals were client property, insured, or part of an estate. not established Source: web.archive.org — section heading 'COMPLIANCE AND SECURITY', third bullet: 'Custodial services managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'
  4. Holder The only disclosure ever made was that custodial services were 'managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE' — no name, no jurisdiction beyond that, no account type, no sub-custodian chain and no investor-protection scheme. not established Source: web.archive.org — section heading 'COMPLIANCE AND SECURITY', third bullet: 'Custodial services managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'
  5. Holder A holder facing a custodian failure would not know which firm had failed. not established Source: web.archive.org — section heading 'COMPLIANCE AND SECURITY', third bullet: 'Custodial services managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'

What if… The token issuer goes bankrupt.

Remora Markets — answer documented.
What if… The token issuer goes bankrupt.3 actors (Token issuer, Token program and keys, Holder); 5 numbered steps. 1. The token issuer goes bankrupt. (catalogue) 2. Reaches the holder along “Ownership of the underlying” (catalogue) 3. There was no insolvency estate and no process to claim in: Step Finance failed to raise or sell and simply stopped, taking the platform with it. (documented) 4. Nothing bankruptcy-remote was ever disclosed — no SPV, trust, security interest or ring-fencing — and Solana Compass names the structural cause plainly. (documented) 5. The only thing holders were given was an open DEX pool at a stale price; there was no administrator, no waterfall, no claims window and no communication after it. (documented)Token issuerToken programand keysHolder1The token issuer goes bankrupt.2Reaches the holder along “Ownership of theunderlying”3There was no insolvency estate and noprocess to claim in: Step Finance failed toraise or sell and simply stopped, taking theplatform with it.4Nothing bankruptcy-remote was ever disclosed— no SPV, trust, security interest orring-fencing — and Solana Compass names thestructural cause plainly.5The only thing holders were given was anopen DEX pool at a stale price; there was noadministrator, no waterfall, no claimswindow and no communication after it.
  • documented the issuer’s or a regulator’s own words
  • scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
  1. Token issuer The token issuer goes bankrupt. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — issuer-insolvency
  2. Token issuer → Holder Reaches the holder along “Ownership of the underlying” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: ownership
  3. Holder There was no insolvency estate and no process to claim in: Step Finance failed to raise or sell and simply stopped, taking the platform with it. documented Source: solanacompass.com — section heading 'A Proof Point Cut Short'
  4. Holder Nothing bankruptcy-remote was ever disclosed — no SPV, trust, security interest or ring-fencing — and Solana Compass names the structural cause plainly. documented Source: solanacompass.com — section heading 'A Proof Point Cut Short'
  5. Holder The only thing holders were given was an open DEX pool at a stale price; there was no administrator, no waterfall, no claims window and no communication after it. documented Source: solanacompass.com — section heading 'A Proof Point Cut Short'

What if… The company is acquired or merged, for cash or for shares.

Remora Markets — answer inferred.
What if… The company is acquired or merged, for cash or for shares.5 actors (Underlying company, Custodian or prime broker, Token issuer, Token program and keys, Holder); 5 numbered steps. 1. The company is acquired or merged, for cash or for shares. (catalogue) 2. Reaches the holder along “Corporate actions” (catalogue) 3. Nothing would reach you. (inferred) 4. No corporate-action policy was ever published, the only on-chain adjustment mechanism the mints carry has never been used, and the operator that would have had to receive merger consideration and pass it on no longer exists. (inferred) 5. Cash or stock paid to whoever holds the underlying shares stops there; the rToken would keep trading as a claim on an event nobody processes. (inferred)UnderlyingcompanyCustodian orprimebrokerTokenissuerTokenprogramand keysHolder1The company is acquired or merged, for cashor for shares.2Reaches the holder along “Corporate actions”3Nothing would reach you.4No corporate-action policy was everpublished, the only on-chain adjustmentmechanism the mints carry has never beenused, and the operator that would have hadto receive merger consideration and pass iton no longer exists.5Cash or stock paid to whoever holds theunderlying shares stops there; the rTokenwould keep trading as a claim on an eventnobody processes.
  • inferred our reading of the structure
  • scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
  1. Underlying company The company is acquired or merged, for cash or for shares. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — company-acquired
  2. Underlying company → Holder Reaches the holder along “Corporate actions” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: corporate-actions
  3. Holder Nothing would reach you. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — scaledUiAmountConfig {authority: DQSTm2Wt…, multiplier: 1, newMultiplier: 1, newMultiplierEffectiveTimestamp: 0} (read 2026-09-18)
  4. Holder No corporate-action policy was ever published, the only on-chain adjustment mechanism the mints carry has never been used, and the operator that would have had to receive merger consideration and pass it on no longer exists. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — scaledUiAmountConfig {authority: DQSTm2Wt…, multiplier: 1, newMultiplier: 1, newMultiplierEffectiveTimestamp: 0} (read 2026-09-18)
  5. Holder Cash or stock paid to whoever holds the underlying shares stops there; the rToken would keep trading as a claim on an event nobody processes. inferred Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com — rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe — scaledUiAmountConfig {authority: DQSTm2Wt…, multiplier: 1, newMultiplier: 1, newMultiplierEffectiveTimestamp: 0} (read 2026-09-18)

What if… The company is delisted or goes private.

Remora Markets — answer inferred.
What if… The company is delisted or goes private.5 actors (Underlying company, Custodian or prime broker, Token issuer, Token program and keys, Holder); 4 numbered steps. 1. The company is delisted or goes private. (catalogue) 2. Reaches the holder along “Corporate actions” (catalogue) 3. The token does not terminate and no final valuation happens, because there is no mechanism and no operator to run one. (inferred) 4. No delisting or termination clause was ever published; the rToken simply continues to exist on-chain as a balance whose reference price stops being observable, and the practical consequence — no venue, no quote, no redemption — has already arrived for all five rStocks regardless of what the underlying companies do. (inferred)UnderlyingcompanyCustodian orprimebrokerTokenissuerTokenprogramand keysHolder1The company is delisted or goes private.2Reaches the holder along “Corporate actions”3The token does not terminate and no finalvaluation happens, because there is nomechanism and no operator to run one.4No delisting or termination clause was everpublished; the rToken simply continues toexist on-chain as a balance whose referenceprice stops being observable, and thepractical consequence — no venue, no quote,no redemption — has already arrived for allfive rStocks regardless of what theunderlying companies do.
  • inferred our reading of the structure
  • scenario the scenario or generic chain, not an issuer claim
Steps as text
  1. Underlying company The company is delisted or goes private. scenario Source: Failure-scenario list — company-delisted
  2. Underlying company → Holder Reaches the holder along “Corporate actions” scenario Source: Trust-chain list — flow: corporate-actions
  3. Holder The token does not terminate and no final valuation happens, because there is no mechanism and no operator to run one. inferred Source: web.archive.org — the whole page — published with a 'Terms & Conditions' heading and no body text, so no delisting, termination or final-valuation clause exists
  4. Holder No delisting or termination clause was ever published; the rToken simply continues to exist on-chain as a balance whose reference price stops being observable, and the practical consequence — no venue, no quote, no redemption — has already arrived for all five rStocks regardless of what the underlying companies do. inferred Source: web.archive.org — the whole page — published with a 'Terms & Conditions' heading and no body text, so no delisting, termination or final-valuation clause exists

Technology + legal templates

These conclusions apply only to the exact programme and observed control recipe shown.

Current Solana assets

0 exact token addresses currently inherit this issuer-level analysis unless an asset card records an exception. Watch this issuer programme →

Legal claim and issuing chain
Issuing entity
unknown. No token document names a legal issuing entity. The only legal entity any primary source names is Step Labs LLC, which the 2026 remoramarkets.xyz Privacy Policy defines as "Remora Markets", "we" or "us" — the operator of the website and service — without giving its state or country of organisation, a registered address, a registration number, or any statement that it issued the rTokens. The platform was 'formerly Moose Capital', acquired by Step Finance in December 2024 and rebranded; Step Finance said it had integrated Moose Capital's team and regulatory licences, and the 2026 About page names the acquirer as 'Step Foundation'. The 2025 remora.markets site never named a company, and its Terms & Conditions, Whitepaper, KYC Info and Privacy Policy pages were published as empty stubs (verified in the Wayback captures of 2025-05-16); the 2026 site at remoramarkets.xyz listed four legal pages in its sitemap and footer menu (Privacy Policy, Terms of Use, Disclaimer, Service Providers; sitemap lastmod 2026-01-16), and only the Privacy Policy was ever archived with content: the Wayback Machine holds no capture of the Terms of Use, and its only captures of the Disclaimer and Service Providers pages (2026-03-11 and 2026-04-16) are redirects to the site's /not-available region-block page; archive.today holds nothing for the domain. Note: 'Remora Capital Corporation' (Maryland, SEC CIK 2045370) is a middle-market credit BDC and is NOT related, and nothing connects Step Labs LLC to the London-addressed 'Step Labs XYZ' of steplabs.xyz.
Entity jurisdiction
unknown. The one named entity, Step Labs LLC (the 2026 Privacy Policy's "Remora Markets"), is given no state or country of organisation and no address; the 'LLC' suffix is used by every US state and by several offshore registries, so it does not locate the company, and neither SEC EDGAR full-text search nor the GLEIF LEI register returns any entity of that name (2026-09-23). The 2025 About page claimed only an 'Asset management license in premium offshore jurisdictions' and that 'Custodial services [are] managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'; secondary reporting says Remora was registered in Canada and the UAE. Circumstantial support for the UAE: app.remora.markets is a CNAME to mooseprodapialb-2015871155.me-central-1.elb.amazonaws.com — an AWS load balancer in the UAE (me-central-1) region, whose name preserves the 'Moose' origin. Re-checked 2026-09-18 against both 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8: the CNAME record itself is STILL published, so this piece of circumstantial UAE evidence remains checkable; it is the AWS target that no longer exists, which is why an A lookup for app.remora.markets returns NXDOMAIN.
Governing law
unknown — no readable source states one. The 2025 remora.markets /terms-conditions/ page existed but contained no terms; the 2026 remoramarkets.xyz Terms of Use existed (listed in the sitemap and legal menu, and invoked by the Privacy Policy) but no archive holds its text; the archived 2026 Privacy Policy names Step Labs LLC but states no governing law, forum or dispute clause.
Regulatory status
unknown / self-asserted only. Claimed an unnamed offshore asset-management licence and UAE-regulated custodial providers; no regulator, licence number, prospectus or exemption was ever published. The platform was not available to users in the United States or Europe pending approvals, and required KYB for business users. The 2026 site enforced a region block — "our services are currently not available in your region due to regulatory requirements" — and its Privacy Policy said Step Labs LLC took no deliberate steps to direct the offering at individuals located in the USA or any other sanctioned or prohibited country; neither page names the regulation relied on.
Holder claim
Undocumented. In practice the holder held a platform-issued token that the operator asserted was backed 1:1 by the corresponding security or metal held through an unnamed regulated custodian, redeemable through the platform for USDC. No terms, prospectus or note conditions survive in any readable source — the 2025 legal pages were empty and the 2026 Terms of Use was never archived — so the legal nature, ranking and enforceability of the claim are unknown; the only contracting party a surviving document names is Step Labs LLC, as operator of the website. Post-wind-down the operator characterised it as a USDC redemption claim rather than a claim to the share.
Underlying custodian
unknown — not named in any source that can still be read. The 2025 About page said only 'Custodial services managed by Wealth Management providers regulated in UAE'; the 2026 site at remoramarkets.xyz said each tokenized equity is 'held through a regulated custodian (see legal documentation)', and the Service Providers page of that legal documentation (remoramarkets.xyz/legal-documentation/service-providers) was never archived with content: the Wayback Machine's only two captures, 2026-03-11 and 2026-04-16, are redirects to the site's /not-available region block. A BitGo custody attribution sourced to https://remoramarkets.xyz/proof-of-reserves cannot be corroborated: that domain stopped resolving between 2026-08-14 (the last Wayback capture the host answered) and 2026-09-16 (the first failed check), and neither the Wayback Machine (476 captures of the domain, none of a proof-of-reserves path) nor archive.today holds a copy of the page (checked 2026-09-23). 'unknown' rests on the About page and on the absence of any naming source, not on the dead page, so it stands.
Shareholder rights
Which rights of the share reach the token holder
RightFor the token holderWhy
DividendsNot statedNo terms survive; the programme wound down in February 2026.Source: solanacompass.com · section 'The product'
VotingNot statedNo terms survive.Source: solanacompass.com · section 'The product'
Reports & meetingsNot statedNo terms survive.Source: solanacompass.com · section 'The product'
SplitsNot statedThe mints could rebase but never did; no policy was published.Source: api.mainnet-beta.solana.com · rpc:getAccountInfo FJug3z58gssSTDhVNkTse5fP8GRZzuidf9SRtfB2RhDe extension scaledUiAmountConfig · “multiplier: 1, newMultiplier: 1, newMultiplierEffectiveTimestamp: 0”
TakeoversNot statedNo terms survive.Source: solanacompass.com · section 'The product'
Who can exercise token controls

No installed authority path was established from the supplied token observation.

This is the representative current exact-token recipe. Open the technology + legal templates above for recipe differences. Programme and PDA labels are traced to the effective signer where reviewed evidence permits. Thresholds apply only to the named role; initiate-only members are not counted as voters.

Redemption and holder eligibility

Programme-level answer. Product examples remain labelled and do not establish another token’s terms.

Contractual right
Nodocumented
Eligible holder and route
Documented at programme level. See complete terms.

Originally: hold a Remora platform account (KYC for individuals, KYB for businesses); deposit USDC to mint, redeem through the platform. Post-wind-down: the operator said it was 'developing a redemption process for holders to exchange for USDC', and on 2026-03-02 deployed exit liquidity on Manifest DEX priced at the prior Friday's market close, reachable through the Jupiter and Titan swap routers — i.e. open to any token holder via a DEX rather than a contractual redemption right. Re-checked 2026-09-18: that route is gone too. Jupiter, the router the wind-down told holders to use, refuses to quote the rTokens at all (TOKEN_NOT_TRADABLE on TSLAr, GLDr, SPYr and CRCLr; NVDAr, which still answered NO_ROUTES_FOUND on 2026-09-18, answers TOKEN_NOT_TRADABLE too on the 2026-09-23 re-read), the Manifest exit book appears in no aggregator's pool list, and the only pools left are the original 2025 trading pools holding $13.47 across four TSLAr pools, $0.30 on GLDr and $1,040.51 on NVDAr at zero 24-hour volume except $370.99 on NVDAr/USDC. There is no redemption right, no redemption process and now no market: redemption.available is recorded false.

documented
KYC / AML
Yesdocumented
Minimum
Documented at programme level. See complete terms.

unknown — fractional shares supported (9 decimals)

documented
Fees
Documented at programme level. See complete terms.

unknown

documented
Timing and settlement asset
Documented at programme level. See complete terms.

Originally USDC on Solana (mint and redeem); post-wind-down, a DEX exit-liquidity pool on Manifest routed via Jupiter/Titan. As of 2026-09-18 no rail functions: Jupiter will not quote the mints and the residual Raydium pools hold double-digit dollars. Withdrawal of the token itself to self-custody still works, which is not a redemption rail.

documented
Route currently available
Not establishedunknown
Successful redemption independently observed
Not establishedunknown
Secondary-market exit
Asset-specific; inspect the exact-token report for current venues and liquidity.
Timing / SLA
Not established
Transfer mechanism
permanent-delegate
US persons excluded
Yes
Who keeps the price honest

Programme-level answer: who can create and redeem at the issuer, so a reader knows whether a token’s premium can be arbitraged away.

No one can create or redeem, so nothing ties the price to the share: it is what the last trade paid. There is no market left either.

Who can create and redeem
No one: Remora wound down in February 2026. The platform that minted and redeemed is offline and the exit pool it pointed holders to is gone.
How
None.
How fast
None.
When
None.
Minimum
None
Cost
None
Shares or cash
No.

Read on 2026-09-30 from the issuer’s redemption terms; the terms and their sources are under Can a holder redeem?.

Backing, custody and insolvency
Collateral ratio
1:1
Composition
shares
Rehypothecation
undisclosed
Bankruptcy remote
Not established
Security interest
Not established
Verification type
none
Verification agent
unknown
Verification frequency
Claimed 'Monthly Proof of Reserve audits' on the About page; no auditor named, no report ever located
Verification notes
No proof-of-reserve report, feed or oracle was found from any primary source. The only reserve figure the issuer ever displayed was its own 'CUSTODIED SHARES' column beside 'TOKEN SUPPLY' on the 2026 products page (Wayback capture of 2026-01-29; e.g. TSLAr 3,079 / 3,079), with no custodian, date or attestor. There is no Chainlink PoR feed, no attestation firm named, and no API. Post-wind-down the operator merely asserted that 'all rTokens are still fully backed at a 1:1 ratio' with no supporting evidence. The claim of monthly third-party PoR audits should be treated as unverified marketing, not an attestation.

How custody affects DeFi enforcement →

Corporate actions and economics

Fees, who gets paid and long-term incentives → · Initial programme research; coverage gaps are marked.

Corporate actions
unknown. The mints carry the Token-2022 scaledUiAmountConfig extension — the same mechanism xStocks uses for rebasing dividends and splits — but the multiplier is 1 with no scheduled change on every mint inspected (TSLAr, NVDAr, GLDr), so no rebasing had ever been applied. No dividend, split or delisting policy was ever published.
Pricing
reference market: platform-mark · notes: Minting was priced at 'the current price on traditional exchanges' per the platform's own How It Works page — a platform mark, with no named oracle. Arbitrage depended entirely on the platform's mint/redeem window being open to the arbitrageur, which required an account; that window is now closed. The wind-down exit liquidity was priced off the prior Friday's market close, i.e. a stale mark. Third-party valuations disagree THREE ways for the same platform within a day, across more than two orders of magnitude: CoinGecko's 'Remora Markets Tokenized rStocks' category reports a ~$138.9M aggregate market cap, RWA.xyz reported $1.87M distributed asset value on 17 September 2026 ($2.13M on 24 September), and DefiLlama reported $479,846 on 18 September ($296,074 on 24 September, after a one-day $2,834,038 data point dated 20 September). Nor is any one of them self-consistent: DefiLlama's own daily series records $0 on 42 days between 2026-07-02 and 2026-09-10 before returning to $479,846, and its own record has flagged the protocol dead since 2026-02-23 while it keeps publishing a daily figure. Treat all third-party valuation figures for these tokens as unreliable.
Primary documents and evidence

Inspect source freshness and individual claims →

Open research questions (7)